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Its not enough to be against censorship or self-censorship. . . . 
In a free society, you must be for the right to offend.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rude get a lot of attention.2 Not only do we notice 
impolite acts by individuals in the public eye, but a perceived 
overall coarsening of manners and pervasive incivility have 
become familiar subjects of commentary.3 Another social 
phenomenon, however, is less apparent: rude acts are not 
judged equitably. Whether one is sanctioned at all and the 
severity of ones sanction have historically been dependent upon 
contingent and subjective perceptions of ones entitlement to 
deference. This Article will demonstrate that the deference 
dynamic is fully operative in the legal profession. This Article 
presents the results of an empirical study, which shows that the 
                                                     
 1. MARK KINGWELL, A CIVIL TONGUE 231 (1995) (citation omitted) (discussing 
Susan Sontags advertisement of her lecture, The Writers Freedom: Literature and 
Literacy, which was delivered in Toronto on March 29, 1993). 
 2. See John Allemang, A Rude Awakening, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 11, 2009, at F1 
(interviewing Professor Benet Davetian, the Chair of Sociology at the University of Prince 
Edward Island, and discussing that rude people have attracted attention and even found 
it a profitable profession as far back as Colonel William dAlton Mann in the 1890s); see 
also MARK CALDWELL, A SHORT HISTORY OF RUDENESS 1521 (David Stanford Burr ed., 
1999) (expounding further on Colonel Manns scandalous weekly publication, Town 
Topics, and the attention it got him). 
 3. Rude behavior by a public figure often provokes a torrent of commentary 
condemning declining civility. See, e.g., Joanne B. Freeman, Joe Wilsons War, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at A19 (discussing the implications of Representative Addison 
Graves Wilsons shouting out You lie! to President Barack Obama during a 
congressional address); Frank Newport, Two in Three Americans Oppose Rep. Joe 
Wilsons Outburst, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/122942/two-three-
americans-oppose-rep-joe-wilson-outburst.aspx (reporting that 68% of Americans 
interviewed opposed Wilsons outburst, while 21% supported his actions). 
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lawyers most likely to be sanctioned for incivility are those 
whom the profession affords the least entitlement to 
deferencelawyers who represent individuals. The study also 
shows that incivility directed towards those whom the 
profession affords the greatest entitlement to deferencejudges 
(rather than lawyers, clients, or witnesses)is the type of 
rudeness most likely to result in professional sanctions. This 
Article explores the fundamental challenge bias presents for 
civility advocates: whether the desirable aspects of the ideal of 
civility can be advanced without perpetuation of illegitimate, 
disparate, and subjective standards. 
The notion of civility has captured the imagination of 
philosophers, political theorists, and historians who have created 
a rich body of scholarship dedicated to defining the essential 
attributes of a civil society.4 One recurrent theme of these studies 
is that the rules of polite social interaction were historically 
based on a concept of deference that had its origins in aristocratic 
societies.5 The obligation of members of the lower classes to defer 
to those in the upper classes was the organizing principle of 
European social structure.6 Elaborate rules of etiquette became 
intertwined with evolving class distinctions.7 Because 
deference-based notions of civility are not easily woven into the 
social fabric of an egalitarian republic, the intersection between 
manners and class has posed difficulties for Americans from the 
beginning. Civil society scholars continue to explore whether the 
structures of civility, apparently so deeply bound up with 
deference and restraint and aristocratic privilege, [can] be put in 
the service of justice in a society of democratic interests.8 
                                                     
 4. See infra Part V.B. See generally P. M. Forni, DR. FORNIS CIVILITY WEB SITE, 
http://krieger.jhu.edu/civility (last visited Jan. 12, 2011) (noting that Professor Forni, who 
teaches at Johns Hopkins University, co-founded the Johns Hopkins Civility Projectnow 
The Civility Institutewhich he now directs); THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVILITY IN 
GOVERNMENT, http://www.instituteforcivility.org (last visited Jan. 12, 2011) ([A] 
grassroots, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that is building civility in a society that 
all too often seems tilted toward uncivil speech and actions.). 
 5. See EIKO IKEGAMI, BONDS OF CIVILITY 29 (2005) (relating the culture of civility 
to prior developments of aristocratic modes of sociability). 
 6. See BENET DAVETIAN, CIVILITY: A CULTURAL HISTORY 24 (2009) (describing how 
in early medieval Christian Europe, paying homage to lords and chieftains formed the 
foundation of feudal society); TIMOTHY JAY, CURSING IN AMERICA 10103 (1992). 
 7. See DAVETIAN, supra note 6, at 2324 (asserting that courtesy in Europe 
during the Middle Ages establish[ed] and maintain[ed] rigid differentiations between 
individuals possessing disparate amounts of military power, social prestige, and 
wealth); TIMOTHY JAY, WHY WE CURSE 20507 (2000) (Etiquette permits those with 
power to control the ill-mannered underclass by denying them access to contexts of social 
power.). 
 8. KINGWELL, supra note 1, at 240. 
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The legal profession has struggled for many years with its 
perception of increasing incivility and widespread disregard for 
professional norms of behavior among lawyers.9 The lawyers 
representational role complicates efforts to address attorney 
incivility because when lawyers misbehave, they are often 
acting not only as individuals, but are also functioning as 
agents or advocates for others. For this and other reasons, 
commentators tend to view the practice of law as a unique 
environment with its own singular history and special adaptive 
culture.10 
The professions response has been to embrace what sets 
lawyers apart from others. The prevalent ideology for defining and 
remedying the misbehavior problem from within the profession 
has been the professionalism paradigm.11 Professionalism 
emphasizes conformity to a shared vocational vision and the 
acculturation lawyers receive while in law school, through the bar 
admission process, and during subsequent exposure to the norms 
of practice.12 This approach is self-consciously isolating.13 The 
Bars professionalism orthodoxy is largely unconcerned with 
what history, sociology, social psychology, psychiatry, 
philosophy, linguistics, and political theory have to say about 
civility.14 This Article argues that the legal profession cannot 
make civility a more democratic ideal unless the practicing Bar 
abandons its ideological isolationism and incorporates relevant 
                                                     
 9. See Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of the 
Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century 
Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 12 (2005) (In response [to changing 
attitudes regarding the legal community], the past century saw repeated and sustained 
professionalism movements, aimed at promoting an ideal of professionalism in legal 
practice.). 
 10. See OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 27888 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002) 
(tracing the development of professional responsibility from its origins in 1817, continuing 
through the formation of the American Bar Association in 1878, and up to more recent 
sources of professional obligations and standards). 
 11. See infra pp. 115253. 
 12. See Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics, 61 
MD. L. REV. 217, 22122, 234 (2002) (describing Dean Anthony Kronman, a noted 
supporter of professionalism, as advocating that the profession look inward to ancient 
assumptions). 
 13. For example, note Levines observance that Anthony Kronmans defense of 
professionalism is that the Bars traditional ideals are the solution to crisis in the legal 
profession. Id. at 21920. 
 14. But see ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY AND 
POLICY 2023 (1994) (addressing professionalism from a sociological perspective and 
arguing that sociologists have as great a role in defining professionalism as any other 
group); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC AGE 249 (2008) (arguing for reconsideration of the adversarial ethic in light 
of larger societal changes). 
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insights from other disciplines into its working conception of 
professionalism. 
In Part II, this Article explains why an approach to 
incivility that relies on ideals expressed as catch phrases, such 
as lawyers are officers of the court and law is a learned 
profession, not a trade, is problematic and creates a space 
within which deference-based norms may operate. Part III 
reports the results of an empirical study designed to determine 
whether judges and disciplinary tribunals are applying 
deference-based notions of civility and whether case law is 
giving the concept of civility normative content that is 
independently viable, capable of articulation, and susceptible to 
fair administration. The study produced a troubling profile of 
the type of lawyer most likely to be punished for being impolite 
or offensive.15 Well-known attorney Geoffrey Fieger fits this 
profile, and Part IV uses the Michigan Bars efforts to sanction 
Fieger for criticizing the judiciary as an illustration of the 
dominant professionalism paradigm at work. The practical 
effect of cases like Fiegers has been to vindicate, to some 
extent, the Bars ability to discipline lawyers for using crude 
speech to criticize judges. The doctrinal result, however, is a 
more ambiguous stalemate between professionalisms laudatory 
goals of protecting the rule of law and the integrity of the 
judicial system, and a devastating First Amendment critique of 
suppressing politically-charged speech by a lawyer attempting 
to advance the cause of a client. Part V suggests that the way 
around the doctrinal impasse is to develop an understanding of 
rudeness based on a broader psychological, historical, and 
political perspective. This approach generates a theory of 
civility that predicts and explains the results of the empirical 
study. In Part VI, this Article contends that courts will continue 
to apply prohibitions against incivility in a biased manner 
unless they consider the concerns other disciplines have voiced 
about punishing citizens in a democratic society for being 
impolite and acknowledge the inherently contingent nature of 
judgments about impolite, rude, offensive, or disrespectful 
speech and behavior. Finally, this Article concludes that 
because of the demonstrated risk of bias, courts should refrain 
from punishing incivility unless they can identify and articulate 
a tangible threat to the fair administration of justice in an 
impending or pending matter. 
                                                     
 15. See infra Part III.F (summarizing the results of study and finding that the most 
likely lawyer to be cited is one who represents an individual and speaks improperly to a 
judge). 
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II. THE ELUSIVE ASPIRATION 
Whatever else may be said about professionalism, its 
usefulness as a basis for commentary cannot be denied. Two 
strains of observation run through most of the numerous 
meditations on the meaning of professionalism: concern about 
increased incivility and a desire to justify the uniqueness of the 
legal profession because of its commitment to a set of ideals.16 To 
the extent that these works make any recommendations at all, 
they tend to be couched in very general terms. Lawyers should 
have good character, and the Bar should address attorney 
misbehavior by communicating and reaffirming the aspirations 
of the profession and encouraging individual lawyers to conform 
their conduct to purportedly shared normative ideals.17 The 
catechisms of professionalism do, at a minimum, seem to provide 
an outlet for expressing widespread concern about the state of 
the profession and reassurance that something is being done to 
stem the perceived tide of disintegration. 
Professionalism, however, has encountered difficulties 
when it has attempted to move beyond ideology and into the 
realm of action. The idealistic approach to incivility has been 
difficult to apply consistently when it is forced outside Bar 
luncheons and law school graduation speeches, and into 
courtrooms and disciplinary tribunals. Examination of the cases 
included in the database described in the next section reveals 
that the efforts of judges and disciplinary authorities to 
sanction or otherwise control rude, impolite, offensive, 
discourteous, and disrespectful behavior have produced a 
number of complex legal problems.18 
Professor Fred Zacharias has explained that overemphasis 
on a single paradigm . . . tends to produce idealized rules, and 
idealized rules are likely to be difficult to enforce.19 The 
professionalism paradigm has produced two idealized rules: that 
the practice of law should be a profession and not a trade;20 and 
                                                     
 16. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Remarks, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 949, 954 (1995). 
 17. See Jeffrey M. Vincent, Aspirational Morality: The Ideals of ProfessionalismPart 
II, UTAH B.J., Apr. 2002, at 24, 2426 (detailing the recommendations of the National Action 
Plan, which required the Bar admission process to reinforce the ideals of conduct expected of 
attorneys). 
 18. See infra Part IV.B (identifying, for example, the problematic interaction 
between sanctions for incivility and the First Amendment). 
 19. Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 74 (2007). 
 20. Levine, supra note 12, at 235 (quoting Anthony T. Kronman, Legal 
Professionalism, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999)). But see ROY D. SIMON, CAROL A. 
NEEDHAM & BURNELE V. POWELL, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: CASES AND 
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that lawyers should be officers of the court.21 According to its 
advocates, professionalism involves adherence to an unwritten 
code of behavior that goes beyond the baseline requirements of 
the rules of professional responsibility.22 Internalizations of the 
officer of the court and law is a profession norms are supposed 
to produce a feeling of separateness from non-lawyers that 
engenders pride in being a professional and a resulting 
willingness to refrain from incivility. 
If enforced, these norms also allow courts to punish or 
reprimand lawyers by simply labeling their behavior 
unprofessional.23 The refusal to unpack the officer of the court 
and law is not a business ideals has the effect of allowing the 
Bar to advocate enforcement of open-ended norms that are not 
the subject of legislative deliberation or even much informal 
debate.24 This is an ideal environment for judges to put into 
effect, consciously or unconsciously, their expectations about 
entitlement to deference. 
Not surprisingly, using the concept of professionalism as 
anything more than a label to be attached to conduct redressable 
through other more concrete legal provisions has, as the 
following sections demonstrate, proven difficult and 
controversial. Expositions of professionalism are careful to avoid 
giving much political, ideological, sociological, moral, or 
psychological content to the professionalism ideal. Pressing for 
more detail, or raising concerns about unacknowledged value 
judgments (about which consensus does not exist), is unwelcomed 
heresy. One scholar has said that professionalism is analogous to 
declaration of a religious belief.25 
Not only is the content of these norms elusive, but their 
place in the sprawling constellation of rules regulating attorneys 
                                                     
MATERIALS 413 (4th ed. 2009) (citation omitted) (arguing that the legal profession has 
always sent profoundly mixed messages about whether law is a business). 
 21. Marvin E. Aspen, Let Us Be Officers of the Court, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 94, 94. 
The officer of the court notion had previously been given a developed meaning in 
disciplinary law as a basis for the requirement of candor towards the tribunal that 
modifies the obligations of zealous advocacy. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.3 
cmt. 2 (2010); CTR. FOR PROFL RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 431 (2006) 
(stating Rule 3.3 was originally adopted in 1983). 
 22. See, e.g., Vincent, supra note 17, at 24 (Certainly, the concept of professionalism 
encompasses more than mere adherence to the minimal standards of ethical conduct.). 
 23. See, e.g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assn v. Berezniak, 127 N.E. 36, 40 (Ill. 
1920) (declaring that a lawyers unprofessional advertising, if continued, would lead to 
disbarment). 
 24. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 289 (2006). 
 25. See Levine, supra note 12, at 22021 (examining the views of Dean Kronman, a 
proponent of the professionalism model). 
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is unclear. Numerous so-called creeds of professionalism, 
civility codes, bounds of advocacy covenants, and other 
aspirational prescriptions have proliferated over the last decade 
and a half.26 The majority of these are purely permissive rules.27 
A recurrent issue is whether the dictates of professionalism 
express any norms beyond or different from those already 
codified in disciplinary rules or grounded in related bodies of case 
law.28 Should punishment for incivility or a lack of 
professionalism be limited to situations involving behavior that 
falls into unoccupied territory between rules? If so, does this not 
transform ideals that are merely aspirational from the 
perspective of the Rules of Professional Conduct into mandatory 
provisions? 
One of the most striking aspects of the civility debate in the 
legal community is that, although the issue is often framed as a 
pressing, unmet need for authority to deal with a new problem, 
in reality the judiciary and the Bar have long possessed extensive 
powers to punish attorneys for disrespect and other forms of 
incivility.29 The common law of professional responsibility is 
extensive and, together with the disciplinary rules, has given 
content to, and refined in application, duties of competency, 
trustworthiness, diligence, zealous advocacy, preservation of 
confidences, conflicts avoidance, loyalty, respect for client 
autonomy, candor towards the tribunal, respect for tribunals, 
respect for opposing parties and their lawyers, prohibitions on 
unfair litigation tactics, and many other exacting requirements.30 
The Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure contain numerous 
                                                     
 26. See Ctr. for Profl Responsibility, Professionalism Codes, A.B.A., 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalism/profcodes.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) 
(providing a comprehensive list of promulgated civility codes and creeds); THE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW, supra note 10, at 278 (tracing the origins of the recent 
movement to the 1986 Stanley Commissions recommendation that lawyer 
professionalism be promoted, leading the ABA and other organizations to approve 
standards and creeds of professionalism for lawyers). 
 27. See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 24. 
 28. See id. at 28791 (discussing the role of judges and lawmakers in 
impos[ing] extra-code constraints, versus lawyer discretion in establishing 
permissive standards). 
 29. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 22 (1908) (setting forth the 
duty of the lawyer to maintain a respectful attitude, demonstrate candor and fairness, 
and refrain from unprofessional and dishonorable conduct). The Canons of Professional 
Ethics have since been replaced with the more forceful ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT ixx (2010). 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT passim (2010); see Benjamin P. Cooper, The 
Lawyers Duty to Inform His Client of His Own Malpractice, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 186 
(2009) ([The] Model Rules of Professional Conduct derive from the common law of 
fiduciary relationships . . . .). 
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provisions for sanctioning lawyers.31 Tribunals also have local 
rules of court administration that may impose courtesy 
requirements.32 
In addition, courts have broad powers to hold attorneys and 
litigants in contempt of court, which, in general terms, can be 
defined as acts calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a 
court in the administration of justice, or lessen its authority or its 
dignity, including primarily disobedience of courts orders.33 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has also expansively defined the inherent 
power of courts to control the behavior of the lawyers who appear 
before tribunals, which includes the power to sanction 
litigation-related conduct that occurs both inside and outside the 
courtroom.34 Various statutes exist that are designed to penalize 
vexatious conduct in litigation.35 The Oath of Admission to the 
Bar is also occasionally cited as a basis for reprimanding 
incivility, but its prohibition against offensive personality is 
rarely an independent basis for punishment.36 
                                                     
 31. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (describing the grounds and procedures for 
imposing sanctions for making improper representations to the court); FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(b)(2), (d)(3) (describing the types of sanctions that may be imposed for discovery 
violations). 
 32. See, e.g., SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF SACRAMENTO, LOCAL RULES, at 
apps. AB, (amended Jan. 24, 2011), available at http://www.saccourt.ca.gov/local-
rules/docs/local-rules.pdf. 
 33. ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFL CONDUCT 61:120102 (2009) 
(discussing the breadth of the contempt doctrine and its limitations). 
 34. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991) (affirming courts 
inherent authority to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of 
discharging their traditional responsibilities). For articles discussing the use of inherent 
authority, see generally Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating 
Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 
214751 (2003); Judith A. McMorrow, Jackie A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone, 
Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported 
Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 143233 (2004); Judith A. McMorrow, The 
(F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. 
REV. 3, 1922 (2005); Jason Mehta, The Development of Federal Professional 
Responsibility Rules: The Effect of Institutional Choice on Rule Outcomes, 6 CARDOZO 
PUB. L., POLY, & ETHICS J. 57, 6970 (2007); Jessica Shpall, A Shakeup for the Duty of 
Confidentiality: The Competing Priorities of a Government Attorney in California, 41 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 701, 716 (2008). 
 35. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006) (providing for assessments of attorneys fees 
against lawyers found to have unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied proceedings). 
 36. Janelle A. McEachern, Annotation, Engaging in Offensive Personality as 
Ground for Disciplinary Action Against Attorney, 58 A.L.R. 5TH 429 (1998); see, e.g., 
Fla. Bar v. Walton, 952 So. 2d 510, 515 (Fla. 2006) (basing affirmation of an attorneys 
ninety-one-day disciplinary suspension on his motivations, the effect of his actions on his 
clients and the law profession, violations of the Oath of Admission including abstaining 
from offensive personality, and prior disciplinary history); Fla. Bar v. Martocci, 791 So. 2d 
1074, 1077 (Fla. 2001) (approving a referees recommended public reprimand and two-year 
probation based on rule violations that prejudiced the administration of justice and 
disrespectful and abusive comments cross[ing] the line from that of zealous advocacy to 
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Furthermore, numerous provisions of the rules of 
professional responsibility have relevance or are arguably 
applicable in these instances.37 This is ironic given that a 
common definition of professionalism is that its ideals go 
beyond the requirements of these rules.38 The cases belie this.39 
As the empirical study described in the next section shows, 
courts intent on actually sanctioning lawyers acknowledge the 
need for rule-based language by searching for and using it 
whenever possible. They rarely rely upon notions of 
professionalism to do more than condemn or descriptively label 
a lawyers conduct.40 Of course, some jurisdictions have 
mandatory provisions prohibiting discourteous behavior or 
                                                     
unethical misconduct); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Rudolph, 744 N.W.2d 466, 
46768 (Wis. 2009) (imposing stipulated, reciprocal discipline, including a thirty-day 
suspension, from another jurisdiction on the criminal act involved; fraudulent, dishonest, 
or deceitful conduct; potentially prejudicial conduct towards administration of justice; and 
conduct involving offensive personality). 
 37. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2010) (Candor Toward the 
Tribunal); MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2010) (Fairness to Opposing Party and 
Counsel); MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.5 (2010) (Impartiality and Decorum of the 
Tribunal); MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2010) (Respect for Rights of Third 
Persons); MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.2 (2010) (Judicial and Legal Officials); 
MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010) (Reporting Professional Misconduct); 
MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2010) (Misconduct); see also Fred C. Zacharias 
& Bruce Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 9092 
(2009) (describing the sources of disciplinary law available to judges and advocating that the 
RPC should provide a starting point). For instance, Florida has a rule that states: 
A lawyer shall not: . . . (d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of 
law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or 
through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers, on any basis, 
including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, 
national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic 
status, employment, or physical characteristic . . . . 
RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-8.4.  
 38. AM. BAR ASSN, CTR. FOR PROFL RESPONSIBILITY, ABA Professionalism Codes 
and Creeds, in ABA COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND 
STANDARDS 491, 494 (2010 ed. 2009) ([N]ot only will I comply with the letter and spirit 
of the disciplinary standards applicable to all lawyers, but I will also conduct myself in 
accordance with the following Creed of Professionalism . . . .); see Keith W. Rizzardi, 
Defining Professionalism: I Know It When I See It?, FLA. B. J., July/Aug. 2005, at 38, 3839, 
4142, 42 n.12 & n.18 (Harold G. Clark, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Georgia . . . said professionalism differs from ethics in the sense that ethics is a 
minimum standard . . . while professionalism is a higher standard expected of all 
lawyers. (quoting Interview by John W. Spears with Harold G. Clark, Chief Justice, 
Georgia Supreme Court (May 24, 1990), available at http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/ 
TFBProfess.nsf/40090c16eedaf0085256b61000928dc/ac951ac3ada1f20085256b2f006ccda
6?OpenDocument)). 
 39. See generally Donald J. Winder & Jerald V. Hale, Enforcing Civility in an 
Uncivilized World, UTAH B.J., May/June 2009, at 36 (discussing cases in which courts 
have found ways to enforce nonbinding notions of civility). 
 40. Infra Part III.F. 
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speech, but even then reliance upon those provisions alone for 
authority is rare.41 
Given the existence of all of those powerful tools to control 
the behavior of lawyers, together with the Bars aggressive, 
well-supported, and popular professionalism agenda, one would 
predict that the last decade would have experienced a significant 
decline in the frequency of attorney misconduct involving 
discourtesy, rudeness, and disrespectfulness. Instead, the situation is 
perceived by most commentators to have continued to worsen, and 
lawyers and judges continue to complain of growing incivility.42 
Proof, however, of the basic premise of the professionalism 
movement has been elusive because commentators have seldom 
found it necessary or desirable to determine whether the frequency of 
uncivil acts by lawyers is, in fact, increasing or whether widespread 
exposure to the ideals of professionalism has had any effect. 
III. LAWYERS BEHAVING BADLY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
The Author designed a study as original, empirical research 
to explore whether the concepts of offensiveness, incivility, or 
professionalism are, or can be, given any specific normative 
content in a disciplinary setting that is non-duplicative of other 
sanctioning authority, independently viable, capable of 
articulation, and susceptible to fair administration. The program, 
IBM SPSS Statistics, was used to analyze data collected from 
reported legal cases for relevant correlations, regressions, and 
frequencies.43 The Author chose the variables for analysis, 
assessed the cases for the presence or absence of those variables, 
input the data into a database, and used the functions of the 
SPSS program to analyze the data.44 The results of this study are 
reported in the sections that follow. 
                                                     
 41. Both Florida and Michigan have such provisions, but few cases interpret those 
rules as freestanding authority. See MICH. SUPREME COURT, ORDER NO. 1011 (Oct. 26, 
2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/ 
Resources/Administrative/2009-06-102610.pdf (amending the MRPC to read: A lawyer 
shall not . . . (d) engage in undignified or discourteous conduct toward the tribunal); 
RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-8.4 (1993), available at http://www.floridabar.org/ 
TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/982D8C3C832DF2BA85256CBE007C330C/$FILE/M
aster%202010%20RRTFB%20Columns%2012-10-10.pdf (A Lawyer shall not: (d) engage 
in conduct . . . that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including 
to . . . disparage, humiliate, or discriminate . . . .). 
 42. See Sandra Day OConnor, Professionalism, WYO. LAW., Apr. 27, 2004, at 12, 13 
(commenting on the conduct of attorneys and the frustration of lawyers toward the 
growing incivility). 
 43. The SPSS program is widely-used in academic research. IBM SPSS, 
http://www.SPSS.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
 44. The database and the results of the statistical analysis are on file with the author. 
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A. The Goals That Determined the Inclusion of Cases 
The primary objective of this study was to explore how courts 
are actually using the concepts of civility, offensiveness, and 
professionalism. In particular, it sought to identify whether these 
concepts had any normative content independent of the 
prohibitions found in other sources of law governing lawyers. The 
study selected for inclusion only those cases where courts and 
disciplinary tribunals were engaged in condemning or sanctioning 
the speech or conduct of lawyers that did not fit entirely within the 
purview of another category of sanction. The study was also 
designed to determine what specific types of speech or conduct 
were predictive of condemnation or sanction by courts.  
B. The Database of Cases 
For a ten-year period from 1998 to 2008, various Westlaw 
case databases were searched for all available cases where courts 
used the words offensive, uncivil, unprofessional, 
professionalism, and derivations of these words to describe the 
behavior of lawyers. This produced a database of 474 cases, which 
were then screened along the lines set forth below for their 
appropriateness for inclusion in the database. Each of the cases 
selected for inclusion was then analyzed for the existence, or not, 
of the variables described below. The results were entered into a 
database. In each of these cases, the judge or disciplinary tribunal, 
having already labeled the lawyers behavior as lacking in civility 
or professionalism, had to make a second decision: whether to 
impose a sanction beyond that of having the label uncivil or 
unprofessional affixed to the lawyers name in a reported 
opinion. The database, therefore, includes a complete universe of 
decisions to sanction and those not to sanction, and avoids the 
empirical problem of selection for a dependent variable. 
C. The Types of Cases Excluded and Reasons for Exclusion 
The study excluded the following types of cases: 
1. Cases Overturned on Appeal. The study excluded 
overturned cases where reversals had the effect of negating lower 
courts decisions in toto. It also excluded those cases where an 
appellate ruling, in any form, reversed or cast any doubt on a 
lower courts decision to sanction an attorney. 
2. Most Cases Involving Bad Faith Litigation or Discovery 
Abuse. The study excluded most of the cases where courts were 
relying exclusively on bad faith litigation statutory provisions, 
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such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927,45 or the power of courts to sanction 
attorneys and parties for misconduct in the discovery process. 
These cases often included passing references to incivility or a 
lack of professionalism, but were rarely attempting to sanction 
lawyers for conduct so-labeled as separate or independent 
offenses. The database, however, did not exclude those cases 
where it is apparent that courts were assessing separate or 
enhanced sanctions against lawyers because their speech or 
behavior was uncivil or unprofessional. 
3. Most Cases Involving Sixth Amendment Challenges. 
Most cases involving Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of 
counsel challenges do not involve an attempt by a court to sanction 
a lawyer for the separate offense of behaving in an unprofessional 
manner. The issue, instead, is whether a conviction should be 
overturned because of an attorneys deviation from professional 
standards of conduct, which may also involve incivility. The high 
stakes of these cases and the collateral nature of the inquiry into 
professionalism issues warranted their exclusion. 
D. Disclaimers 
Some disclaimers should be considered in evaluating the 
results of the study. The ten-year period is an arbitrary 
timeframe. It was selected because it allowed sufficient time for 
the Bars formal professionalism agenda to have been publicized 
and pursued for at least ten years before the first cases. In 
addition, even though care was taken to avoid omissions, the 
weaknesses inherent in case law database searches could have 
resulted in missed relevant cases. Although the study may not 
include every single case it might have, it identified most of the 
relevant cases and produced a sample large enough to allow 
legitimate observations and conclusions. Furthermore, because 
many of the orders and judgments of the federal district courts, 
both trial judges and magistrates, are available in searchable 
databases (which is not true of state court cases), the federal 
courts contribution and influence to the study is likely 
overstated. Moreover, it is possible that the federal trial courts 
use their power to sanction attorneys in ways that are not typical 
of state trial courts. Because Article III judges are not elected, 
have life tenure, and have immunity from salary reduction, they 
may be more willing to condemn the behavior of lawyers. Many 
state trial level judges are subject to election or re-election and 
                                                     
 45. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006). 
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may feel more beholden to attorneys, and thus less likely to use 
their discretionary powers to sanction them. Finally, empiricism 
of this type is inherently imperfect and to some extent subjective 
even when the database is carefully constructed. Being mindful 
of these limitations helps to insure that the reach of the analysis 
does not exceed the grasp provided by the statistics. 
E. The Statistical Program and Variables Used for Analysis 
The search criteria as modified produced 201 cases. For 
each of the 201 cases, the following data were collected and put 
into an SPSS spreadsheet database. The programs correlation, 
cross-tabulation, and regression functions were then used to 
analyze the variables. 
 
1. Type of tribunal: state court, disciplinary tribunal, or 
federal court. 
2. Level of tribunal assessing the lawyers conduct: 
appellate or nonappellate. 
3. Gender of lawyer: male, female, or unknown. 
4. Type of client: individual, corporate, government 
(non-prosecutor), criminal defendant, or government 
(prosecutor). 
5. Location of misconduct: in the presence of an adjudicator, 
in the work product of a lawyer (other than an appellate 
brief), in an appellate brief, in a communication (letter, 
telephone call, e-mail, etc.), in a legal workplace (law 
office, court clerks office, etc.), or in a non-law related 
location. 
6. Victims or persons towards whom misbehavior was 
directed: judge, opposing counsel, opposing party, 
witnesses, other legal actors (court personnel, etc.), 
lawyers own client, or nonclient/nonlegal person. 
7. Practice-related misconduct: yes or no. 
8. Litigation-related misconduct: yes or no. 
9. Nature of misconduct: 
a. Speech 
i. rude or uncivil 
ii. vulgar or profane 
iii. threatening or aggressive 
iv. defiant  
v. sexual  
vi. accusatory (incompetency, error, stupidity) 
vii. accusatory (bias, prejudgment) 
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viii. accusatory (racism) 
ix. accusatory (sexism) 
b. Conduct 
i. gestures (eye-rolling, smirking, laughing) 
ii. physical (violence, aggression) 
iii. physical (sexual misconduct) 
iv. nonconformance to or disobedience of 
courts order 
v. filing baseless bar grievances against 
opposing counsel or judge 
vi. filing baseless lawsuits against opposing 
counsel or judge, including placing liens on 
property 
10. Authorities cited by court: 
a. contempt 
b. inherent authority 
c. statute, local rule of court, or context-specific (e.g., 
family law) rule 
d. First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
e. Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 
i. RPC Preamble/Scope 
ii. RPC 3.1 (meritorious claims) 
iii. RPC 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal) 
iv. RPC 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and 
counsel) 
v. RPC 3.5(d) (impartiality and decorum of 
the tribunal/conduct intended to disrupt a 
tribunal) 
vi. RPC 8.2(a) (statements about judges) 
vii. RPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice) 
viii. RPC 8.4 (any other section) 
ix. Other RPC (trial publicity, prosecutors 
duties, rights of third persons) 
f. Oath of Admission to the Bar (refrain from 
offensive personality) 
g. Professionalism or courtesy statute or rule 46 
                                                     
 46. Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Utah have promulgated 
courtesy or civility rules. Winder & Hale, supra note 39, at 36, 38 n.1; see, e.g., TEXAS 
LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 10-2 to 10-3, 10-5 (4th ed. 2007) (finding within the 
Texas Lawyers Creed, a Mandate for Professionalism, several references to a 
requirement of civility and courtesy). 
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11. Sanction: referral to disciplinary authority, written or 
verbal condemnation in opinion, ethics or professionalism 
training, disciplinary reprimand, suspension, disbarment, 
or other sanction, including monetary penalties.  
F. Results 
The cases were evenly distributed across the United States 
with a slightly lower percentage coming from the western region 
of the country. They were almost evenly distributed between 
state and federal cases (38.8% state cases and 37.3% federal 
cases), with disciplinary cases comprising 26.9%.47 Overall, the 
frequency of the civility cases increased over the ten-year period. 
Predictably, the overwhelming majority of the cases were not 
only practice-related, but litigation-related as well. A more 
surprising result was that 15.9% of the incivility occurred in 
appellate briefs.48 While 80% of the misbehaving lawyers were 
men and 19% were women,49 none of the variables, other than 
those involving sexually inappropriate language and sexual 
misconduct, were correlated with gender. 
The majority of the lawyers in these cases (57.7%) represented 
clients who were individuals. Corporate clients were the next 
largest represented group at 18.4%. Other groups of represented 
clients included criminal defendants at 10.9%, governments (state 
and federal prosecutors in criminal proceedings) at 8.0%, and other 
government entities at 7.0%.50 Lawyers directed their incivilities 
primarily at opposing counsel (58.7%) and judges (52.2%).51 Other 
intended victims were opposing parties (27.4%), witnesses (11.9%), 
other legal actors (such as judicial assistants, clerks of the court) 
(7.0%), their own clients (3.5%), and others (2.5%).52 
                                                     
 47. A small number of the cases were classified as both state and federal, or both 
disciplinary and federal, primarily because of attempts by lawyers to remove some of the 
cases to federal court. 
 48. For a discussion of inappropriate language in appellate briefs, see Stuart C. 
Markman, Responding to Appellate Lawyers Who Cross the Line, 32 STETSON L. REV. 425, 
42930 (2003) (discussing inappropriate language and accusations in appellate briefs); 
Steven Wisotsky, Invective on Appeal: Impugning the Integrity of Judges, FLA. B.J., May 
2005, at 41, 4142 (analyzing the problem of inappropriate language in appellate briefs 
and MRPC 8.2(a)). 
 49. In 1% of the cases, the gender of the lawyer was not apparent from available 
resources. 
 50. The total of these percentages exceeds one hundred because a few cases 
involved multiple clients who fell into different categories. 
 51. The total of the percentages exceeds one hundred because many of the lawyers 
directed their discourteous speech or behavior towards more than one type of victim. 
 52. This included individuals who were not related to the legal proceedings and 
were not the lawyers clients. 
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The main focus of the study was the nature of the speech and 
behavior that courts characterized as uncivil, discourteous, 
unprofessional, or offensive. The incidents were divided into the 
general categories of speech and behavior. The speech category 
was further broken down by type, which produced the following 
results: The majority of the impolite speech was rude53 (67.7%) and 
defiant (59.7%). The next largest category of speech (22.9%) that 
prompted condemnation was speech that accused judges or other 
members of the legal system of general bias against the lawyer or 
his/her client. Speech that accused judges of incompetence was 
present in 15.9% of the cases, followed by vulgar speech at 13.9%. 
Another 10.0% of the incidents involved threatening speech, while 
7.5% consisted of accusations that a judge was racist. Some of the 
cases (4.5%) sanctioned lawyers for using sexually inappropriate 
language, such as making sexual comments to or about opposing 
counsel or court personnel. Finally, 2.0% of the cases involved 
accusations that judges were sexist. 
In the behavior category, defiant behavior represented the 
majority of uncivil acts at 57.2%. The filing of actions with no 
evidentiary support or repetitive motions occurred in 13.4% of 
the cases. Inappropriate gestures (8.0%), sexual misconduct 
(3.5%), and violent or aggressive acts (2.5%) comprised the 
remainder of uncivil behavior. 
In addressing incivility, judges and disciplinary tribunals 
make reference to, and rely upon, a variety of legal provisions as 
sources of their authority to impose sanctions or penalties for 
incivility, discourteousness, and disrespect. These provisions are 
of three types. First, a court other than a disciplinary tribunal 
may use statutory provisions and rules of procedure that clearly 
authorize the court to sanction lawyers. The study showed that 
29.9% of the cases made reference to rules of procedure (such as 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11), 17.9% grounded their power 
in the courts inherent authority to control the conduct of 
attorneys appearing before them,54 13.9% involved exercises of 
the power to hold lawyers in contempt, and only 5% of the cases 
relied upon statutory provisions (such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
The second category of authority is sanctioning power based 
on the use of the RPC, but here a distinction should be made 
                                                     
 53. Speech involving interruptions, yelling, name-calling, and general 
disrespectfulness was classified as rude. Vulgar speech involved profanity, cursing, 
racial slurs, and other insults of this type. 
 54. For an example of this, see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991) 
(upholding a district courts use of inherent power to impose sanctions for a partys bad 
faith conduct). 
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between the use of these rules by disciplinary tribunals, which is 
explicitly authorized, and their use in civil or criminal cases. 
Courts seldom recognized the issue of whether using the 
disciplinary rules for this purpose was appropriate. The study 
found that many courts used them to give content and guidance 
to their use of inherent authority in particular. The RPC most 
commonly referenced in the inherent authority cases was 
RPC 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, at 20.4% of the cases. Other provisions 
of RPC 8.4, including the general prohibition against misconduct 
and conduct that reflects on a lawyers honesty, trustworthiness, 
and fitness, were used in 16.4% of the cases. RPC 8.2(a), which 
prohibits a lawyer from making false statements concerning the 
qualifications or integrity of a judge, was employed in 11.4% of 
the cases. The remainder of the RPC cited included RPC 3.3, 
candor towards the tribunal, at 9.0%; RPC 3.5(d), prohibition 
against engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal, at 
8.5%; RPC 3.4, knowing disobedience to an obligation under the 
rules of a tribunal, at 7.0%; and RPC 3.1, a requirement that 
claims have a non-frivolous basis in law and fact, at 2.0%. 
The third category of provisions includes those whose status 
as independent bases of authority to sanction is unclear. For 
example, 6.5% of the cases cite to the Preamble to the RPC, 
which is not drafted as a basis for discipline.55 Other courts 
(8.0%) relied upon, or made reference to, provisions in the 
attorneys Oath of Admission to the Bar.56 Finally, although 
73.1% of the cases cited the concept of professionalism, the 
study did not reveal any courts that relied upon this concept 
exclusively or primarily for any sanction other than a written or 
verbal condemnation in an opinion or during a proceeding. 
The study revealed the following frequencies for each of the 
types of sanctions: written or verbal condemnations occurred in 
77.6% of the cases, monetary and other penalties in 34.3%, 
                                                     
 55. The language most often referenced is the instruction that lawyers have respect 
for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges and that lawyers should 
uphold legal process. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 5 (2010). 
 56. E.g., Arizona Replaces Decree That Lawyers Abstain From All Offensive 
Personality, 23 LAW. MANUAL ON PROFL CONDUCT 505 (2007); McEachern, supra note 36; 
see also Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyers Oath: Both Ancient and Modern, 22 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 3, 4344 (2009) (noting that the oath was once the principal source of 
attorney regulation but is often overlooked today); Brian E. Mitchell, Note, An Attorneys 
Constitutional Right to Have an Offensive Personality? United States v. Wunsch and 
Section 6068(f) of the California Business and Professions Code, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 703, 
70410 (1997) (addressing the background of United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110 (9th 
Cir. 1996), by detailing various California court decisions applying provisions from the 
statutory codification of an attorneys general oath). 
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suspensions in 15.9%, reprimands in 10.4%, disbarment in 3.5%, 
and orders to attend ethics CLE or diversion programs in 2.0%. 
In a combined total of 62.2% of the cases, the courts imposed a 
sanction beyond, or in addition to, a verbal or written 
condemnation. Courts referred lawyers to the Bar for discipline 
in 8.5% of the cases in which they found incivility or a lack of 
professionalism in addition to breaches of the RPC. 
 The data can be analyzed from a number of different 
perspectives, only some of which were germane to the bias and 
deference issues that are the focus of this Article. Significant 
correlations were observed in the areas of the type of authority 
upon which the courts relied, the nature of the misconduct 
correlated with sanctions, the types of clients represented by 
sanctioned lawyers, and the role of the First Amendment. 
The only two sources of authority that were correlated with 
discipline (other than a verbal or written condemnation) were to 
a courts invocation of RPC 8.2(a), which forbids a lawyer from 
making false statements concerning the qualifications or 
integrity of a judge, and RPC 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.57 A courts reliance 
upon, or reference to, other sources of judicial power to sanction, 
including, astonishingly, the power of contempt, was not 
predictive of serious punishment. The use of inherent authority, 
which gradually increased as a percentage of the total cases over 
the ten-year period, was highly correlated to federal courts and 
was infrequently used by state courts. 
Another clear and significant finding concerned defiant 
speech, which was defined as speech that constitutes, in and of 
itself, or states a refusal to comply with a courts orders, rules, or 
directives. This was the single type of conduct that was generally 
correlated with discipline beyond a verbal or written 
condemnation. More specifically, defiant speech directed towards 
judges was highly correlated with sanctions, even though, 
paradoxically, the use of the contempt power was not. The 
significance of this finding is apparent only when one considers 
that all of the other types of speech and behavior, directed at all 
of the other victims, were not predictive of a sanction. 
A particularly noteworthy finding was that representing an 
individual client was highly correlated with serious discipline. 
Conversely, representing a corporation or being a prosecutor was 
highly negatively correlated with being sanctioned. This 
troubling result was not explained by other variables. Along 
                                                     
 57. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.2(a), 8.4(d) (2010). 
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these same lines, even though the lawyers First Amendment 
rights were raised or considered in only 6.5% of these cases, 
invocation of the First Amendment was highly correlated to 
representation of an individual. 
Putting all of these observations together results in a typical 
profile of a lawyer who is in the greatest danger of being 
sanctioned for incivility beyond a verbal or written 
condemnation: he/she represents an individual, speaks defiantly 
to a judge, and has been accused of making a false statement 
about the qualifications or integrity of a judge or engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. A 
closer examination of one of these cases, typical in some respects 
but extraordinary in others, is illuminating. 
IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE 
Geoffrey Fieger is a nationally known, high-profile 
Michigan plaintiffs personal injury lawyer.58 He has also been 
the central figure in a series of protracted legal battles with 
Michigan attorney disciplinary authorities and the courts 
regarding their efforts to sanction him for statements critical of 
the judiciary he made while representing clients. One of these 
legal entanglements began with Fiegers involvement in a 
personal injury case, Badalamenti v. William Beaumont 
Hospital.59 
In 1997, Fieger represented Salvatore Badalamenti, the 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case.60 A Michigan jury 
ultimately returned a $15 million verdict in Badalamentis favor. 
The defendants appealed, arguing that the verdict was based on 
insufficient evidence and that Fiegers misconduct during the 
trial denied them their constitutional right to a fair trial.61 The 
Court of Appeals of Michigan unanimously ruled in favor of the 
defendants.62 Judges Jane Markey, Richard Bandstra, and 
                                                     
 58. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Fieger v. Mich. Sup. Ct., 130 S. Ct. 1048 
(2010) (No. 09-142). He is also known for representing Dr. Jack Kevorkian and being the 
Democratic Party nominee for Governor of Michigan in 1998. Geoffrey Nels Fieger, FIEGER 
LAW, http://www.fiegerlaw.com/GeoffreyFieger.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). 
 59. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 34; Badalamenti v. William 
Beaumont Hosp., 602 N.W.2d 854, 856, 86061 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). Subsequent to the 
disciplinary cases discussed herein, Fieger continued what one court called his feud with 
the Michigan Supreme Court by litigating the appropriateness of the justices refusals to 
recuse themselves in cases where Fieger represented plaintiffs. See Fieger v. Corrigan, 602 
F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2010); Fieger v. Gromek, 373 F. Appx 567, 56869 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 60. Badalamenti, 602 N.W.2d. at 856. 
 61. Id. at 85657, 860. 
 62. Id. at 860, 862. 
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Michael Talbot held that the trial court should have granted the 
defendants a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because of 
the insufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence.63 The panel also held 
that Fiegers repeated egregious and pervasive misconduct 
completely tainted the proceedings, and by itself would have 
warranted a new trial.64 According to the court, Fieger, without a 
basis in fact, accused defendants and their witnesses of engaging 
in collusion, committing perjury, and destroying, altering, or 
suppressing evidence. He also suggested that one of the 
defendants neglected the plaintiffs medical care in order to have 
a sexual assignation with a nurse.65 
 On August 23, 1999, Fieger commented on the 
Badalamenti decision and the appellate panel on his southeast 
Michigan radio program as follows: 
Hey Michael Talbot, and Bandstra, and Markey, I declare 
war on you. You declare it on me, I declare it on you. Kiss 
my ass, too. . . . [Badalamenti] lost both his hands and both 
his legs, but according to the Court of Appeals, he lost a 
finger. Well, the finger he should keep is the one where he 
should shove it up their asses.66 
On the same radio program two days later, Fieger referred to the 
judges as three jackass Court of Appeals judges.67 In response to 
another persons use of the word innuendo on the show, Fieger 
said, I know the only thing thats in their endo should be a large, 
you know, plunger about the size of, you know, my fist.68 He 
continued, They say under their name, Court of Appeals Judge, 
so anybody that votes for them, theyve changed their name from, 
you know, Adolf Hitler and Goebbels, and I thinkwhat was 
HitlersEva Braun, I think it was, is now Judge Markey, shes 
on the Court of Appeals.69  
Subsequently, through its Grievance Administrator, the 
Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC) filed a formal 
complaint with the Michigan Attorney Discipline Board (ADB), 
which alleged that Fiegers comments on August 23 and 25, 1999, 
were in violation of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct 
(MRPC).70 Among the disciplinary rules the AGC alleged Fieger 
                                                     
 63. Id. at 85657, 85960. 
 64. Id. at 860. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Grievance Admr v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 129 (Mich. 2006). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 130. 
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violated were MRPC 3.5(c), MRPC 6.5(a), and MRPC 8.4(a) and 
(c). MRPC 3.5(c) provides, in relevant part, that a lawyer shall 
not engage in undignified or discourteous conduct toward the 
tribunal.71 MRPC 6.5(a) mandates that [a] lawyer shall treat 
with courtesy and respect all persons involved in the legal 
process.72 MRPC 8.4(a) defines professional misconduct as 
including instances when a lawyer violate[s] or attempt[s] to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or 
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.73 
MRPC 8.4(c) defines professional misconduct to include a lawyer 
engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.74 
While the complaint was pending, the parties stipulated 
that Fieger would not contest that his remarks violated MRPC 
3.5(c) and 6.5(a), and the AGC would in turn dismiss the charges 
alleging violations of MRPC 8.4(a) and (c).75 In addition, the 
parties also stipulated that Fieger would receive a reprimand as 
a sanction, although their agreement was conditioned on the 
discipline being stayed while Fieger argued on appeal that MRPC 
3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a) were inapplicable to his conduct and 
unconstitutional if so applied.76 Fieger contended that the rules 
were inapplicable because his remarks were made after the case 
was completed and occurred outside a courtroom. Further, he 
maintained that the two disciplinary rules were 
unconstitutional because they infringed his First Amendment 
rights.77 The collective effect of the ADBs November 8, 2004 
ruling was in Fiegers favor.78 The majority concluded that the 
plain language of the two rules did not apply to Fiegers 
statements because they were not made either before a tribunal 
or in the context of a pending case.79 The ADB also stated that 
                                                     
 71.  MICH. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.5(c) (2009) (emphasis added), available 
at http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/pdfs/mrpc.pdf. 
 72.  MICH. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 6.5(a) (2009) (emphasis added), available 
at http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/pdfs/mrpc.pdf. 
 73.  MICH. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2009), available at 
http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/pdfs/mrpc.pdf. 
 74.  MICH. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009), available at 
http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/pdfs/mrpc.pdf. 
 75. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 130. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that the government shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech). 
 78. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 130; Fieger, Case No. 01-055-GA, at 29 (Mich. Atty 
Discipline Bd. Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://www.adbmich.org/coveo/opinions/2004-11-
08-01o-55.pdf. 
 79. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 130; Fieger, Case No. 01-055-GA, at 2729. 
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even if the courtesy provisions did apply, Fiegers speech was 
protected by the First Amendment.80 
The AGC appealed the decision to the Michigan Supreme 
Court after Fieger unsuccessfully attempted to remove the case 
to federal court.81 On July 31, 2006, the Michigan Supreme Court 
issued an opinion holding that Fiegers comments concerning the 
judges were made while the case was pending, were directed 
toward the tribunal, and violated the disciplinary rules 
prohibiting undignified or discourteous conduct toward a tribunal 
and requiring attorneys to treat with courtesy and respect all 
persons involved in the legal process.82 The court also held that 
the ADB lacked authority to declare the MRPC 
unconstitutional.83  
Fieger was reprimanded and subsequently turned to the 
federal district court for relief.84 Utilizing the Federal Declaratory 
Judgment Act,85 he sought a declaration that Michigans rules 
were unconstitutional and that he was in danger of repeated 
prosecution.86 Even though a federal court will typically abstain 
from hearing a case that challenges attorney discipline imposed 
by a state court, Fieger was initially successful in obtaining 
federal relief because he did not challenge the Michigan Supreme 
Courts sanction against him.87 The federal district court found no 
procedural bars to exercising jurisdiction and granted summary 
judgment in Fiegers favor. The district court held that 
Michigans civility rules were unconstitutional on their face 
because they were both overly broad and vague, and thus, 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.88 
 Michigan appealed the district courts issuance of an order 
enjoining enforcement of its disciplinary rules to the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.89 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
vacated the declaratory judgment as an abuse of discretion.90 It 
rejected Fiegers argument that the chilling effect of the courtesy 
and civility provisions gave rise to an injury in fact sufficient for 
                                                     
 80. Fieger, Case No. 01-055-GA, at 15. 
 81. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 131 n.7. 
 82. Id. at 13638. 
 83. Id. at 138. 
 84. Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, No. 06-11684, 2007 WL 2571975, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 4, 2007). 
 85.  Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 22012202 (2006). 
 86. Fieger, 2007 WL 2571975, at *1, *2021. 
 87. Id. at *12. 
 88. Id. at *1. 
 89. Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 90. Id. at 974. 
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standing and found that Fiegers prior discipline did not 
constitute a significant possibility of future harm.91 The Sixth 
Circuit held that Fieger failed to articulate with requisite 
specificity the intended speech or conduct that would likely 
subject him to disciplinary action in the future because he made 
only vague suggestions of a general desire to criticize the 
Michigan judiciary.92 In contrast, Judge Merritt, in dissent, 
argued that Fieger had met the requirements for standing under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act.93 
Although their procedural posture is somewhat unusual, the 
various opinions in Fiegers disciplinary cases are an excellent 
illustration of a serious effort to give content to the notion of 
civility and the difficulties courts encounter. What emerges from 
the majority and dissenting approaches in these opinions is a 
point/counter-point clash between two conflicting, and perhaps 
equally dogmatic, paradigms. In general, Bar orthodoxy would 
label Fiegers incivility an absence of professionalism or 
characterize Fieger as engaging in offensive personality and 
applaud the courts efforts to curtail such conduct.94 To the 
dissenters, all those opposed to sanctioning his conduct, Fiegers 
disrespectful and rude speech cannot constitutionally be 
sanctioned because of his First Amendment rights.95 The judges 
throughout the various Fieger cases disagreed on four related 
issues, described below in Sections AD, that reveal the Bars 
dominant professionalism approach to incivility and its legal 
critique. The sections that follow describe these disagreements at 
length, using the various courts words, not to determine which 
position is the stronger one under First Amendment 
jurisprudence, but rather because the civility debate is in large 
part a dispute about language. By listening to the words chosen 
by each side one may discern precisely how this issue is framed 
by the Bar and courts, and, perhaps more importantly, what is 
left out.96 
                                                     
 91. Id. at 965. 
 92. Id. at 964. 
 93. Id. at 978 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 94.  MICH. STATE BAR R. 15, §3(1) (2008) (noting each applicant to the bar must 
swear to refrain from offensive personality). 
 95.  Grievance Admr v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 15354 (Mich. 2006) (Cavanagh, J., 
dissenting); id. at 196200 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 96. For articles addressing the application of the First Amendment to attorney 
discipline for criticizing the judiciary, see generally Terri R. Day, Speak No Evil: Legal 
Ethics v. The First Amendment, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 161 (2008); Margaret Tarkington, The 
Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 
GEO. L. J. 1567 (2009); Angela Butcher & Scott Macbeth, Comment, Lawyers Comments 
About Judges: A Balancing of Interests to Ensure a Sound Judiciary, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL 
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A. Are Lawyers Different and Does That Difference Matter?  
The fundamental issue dividing the majority and the dissent 
in the Fieger Michigan Supreme Court case is a disagreement 
about the extent to which the professional roles of lawyers justify 
broad prohibitions against incivility and discourtesy that have 
the effect of restricting the rights of attorneys to speak freely. 
The majority asserted that an attorney discipline matter is 
constitutionally different and more restrictive rules are 
permissible in such a circumstance.97 From the perspective of the 
First Amendment, the practice of law is not the same as the 
general context of the right of citizens to speak freely.98 The 
majority emphasized the exclusive role of lawyers and noted 
that society has reposed special stewardship duties on lawyers 
on the basis of the venerable notion that lawyers are more than 
merely advocates who happen to carry out their duties in a 
courtroom environment, they are also officers of the court.99 
The majority identified the unique function of lawyers as 
the reason why, in a manner unprecedented in other 
professions, lawyers are licensed in terms of character and 
fitness, and not just competence.100 Michigan, the court noted, 
like many other jurisdictions, requires lawyers to take an oath 
of admission that:  
[P]rovides that the lawyer will, upon being accorded the 
privileges provided by membership in the bar, (1) maintain 
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers, 
(2) abstain from all offensive personality, and (3) conduct 
himself or herself personally and professionally in 
conformity with the high standards of conduct imposed on 
members of the bar as conditions for the privilege to 
practice law in Michigan.101 
                                                     
ETHICS 659 (2004); David R. Cooper, Note, Speaking Out: Lawyers and Their Right to 
Free Speech, 18 REV. LITIG. 671 (1999). 
 97. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 140. 
 98. See id. at 140 n.27 (rebutting the dissents First Amendment arguments by 
explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court has held attorneys to a different professional 
standard). 
 99. Id. at 133. 
 100. Id. at 13334. 
 101. Id. at 134 (footnote omitted) (citing MICH. STATE BAR R. 15, § 3(1) (2008)). The 
Oath of Admission to the Bar taken by lawyers in forty-seven states in some form 
including this language for 125 years provides: 
The general principles which should ever control the lawyer in practice of the 
legal profession are clearly set forth in the following Oath of Admission to the 
Bar, . . . which [the lawyer is] sworn on admission to obey and for the wilful 
violation of which disbarment is provided: I do solemnly swear: . . . I will 
maintain the respect due to the Courts of Justice and judicial officers; . . . I 
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Civility rules, according to the majority, should be read in 
light of the complex code of behavior to which attorneys are 
subject.102 This code is part of the cultural history of the legal 
profession and manifests appropriate respect for the wisdom of 
those who have preceded us in the judiciary in this country.103 
Tellingly, the majority quoted from a century-old opinion by the 
Ohio Supreme Court regarding attorney misbehavior: 
When a man enters upon a campaign of vilification he 
takes his fate into his own hands and must expect to be held 
to answer for the abuse of the privilege extended to him by 
the [C]onstitution. An attorney of more than twenty years 
standing at the bar must be presumed to know the difference 
between respectful, fair and candid criticism, and scandalous 
abuse of the courts which gave him the high privilege, not as 
a matter of right, to be a priest at the altar of justice.104 
For the majority, civility rules do not simply protect the 
sensitivities of judges, but rather, are designed to maintain 
public respect for a rule of law that is dependent on such public 
respect.105 The preservation of the American legal system 
requires that citizens have confidence in the process of 
adjudication as: 
[O]ne in which the fairness and integrity of the process is not 
routinely called into question, one in which the ability of 
judges to mete out evenhanded decisions is not undermined 
by the fear of vulgar characterizations of their actions, one in 
which the public is not misled by name-calling and 
vulgarities from lawyers who are held to have special 
knowledge of the courts, [and] one in which discourse is 
grounded in the traditional tools of the lawlanguage, 
precedents, logic, and rational analysis and debate.106 
Rudeness, discourtesy, and incivility are, thus, according to 
the majority, inherently misleading and dangerous. The majority 
                                                     
will . . . never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any artifice or false statement 
of fact or law; . . . I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no 
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless [I am] 
required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged[.] 
AM. BAR ASSN, REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION 567, 58485 (1908). 
 102. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 13132 (explaining that an attorneys responsibilities 
in the profession are taken into account when drawing a line between robust comment 
that is protected by the First Amendment and comment that undermines the integrity of 
the legal system). 
 103. Id. at 132. 
 104. Id. at 144 (quoting In re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 88 (Ohio 1909)). 
 105. Id. at 133. 
 106. Id. at 132. 
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condemned the dissents repudiation of the courtesy and civility 
rules and charged that they: 
[W]ould usher an entirely new legal culture into this state, 
a Hobbesian legal culture, the repulsiveness of which is 
only dimly limned by the offensive conduct that we see in 
this case. It is a legal culture in which, in a state such as 
Michigan with judicial elections, there would be a 
permanent political campaign for the bench, pitting lawyers 
against the judges of whom they disapprove. It is a legal 
culture in which rational and logical discourse would come 
increasingly to be replaced by epithets and coarse behavior, 
in which a profession that is already marked by declining 
standards of behavior would be subject to further erosion, 
and in which public regard for the system of law would 
inevitably be diminished over time. 
. . . 
 Given the position advanced by the dissenting 
justices in this case . . . one wonders whether the 
dissenting justices would simply surrender the legal 
process to the least-restrained and worst-behaved members 
of the bar. With increasingly little need to adhere to the rules 
necessary to ensure public confidence in the integrity of the 
legal process, the dissenters would create a world in which 
legal questions come increasingly to be decided, not by a fair 
and rational search for truth, but by bullying and uncivil 
behavior, personal abuse, one-upmanship, and public 
exhibitionism on the part of those who are custodians of 
this system, the bar. Justice under the law cannot flourish 
within such a system.107 
The majority characterized Fiegers argument that Michigans 
rules mandating courteous and respectful speech violated the 
First Amendment to be tantamount to an assertion that there 
can be no courtesy or civility rules at all of this sort and that 
judges and other lawyers assailed verbally, as public figures, 
have [only] the same remedies any other public figures have in 
libel and slander law.108 
The dissent acknowledged that lawyers do play a special role 
in society, but condemned the majority for impermissibly 
exalt[ing] the protection of judges feelings over the sanctity of the 
First Amendments guarantee of freedom of speech.109 The dissent 
                                                     
 107. Id. at 144 & n.34. 
 108. Id. at 132. 
 109. Id. at 15354 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); see id. at 164 (A bar composed of 
lawyers of good character is a worthy objective . . . . (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of 
Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957))). 
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found the majoritys treatise on the Michigan Supreme Courts 
duty to oversee the legal profession and foster rules geared 
toward maintaining respect for the judiciary an unpersuasive 
justification for its expansive interpretation of the permissible 
reach of Michigans disciplinary rules.110 The U.S. Supreme Court, 
according to the dissent, has previously explained: 
We recognize the importance of leaving States free to 
select their own bars, but it is equally important that the 
State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory manner nor in such way as to impinge on 
the freedom of political expression or association. A bar 
composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy objective 
but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order to 
obtain that goal. It is also important both to society and the 
bar itself that lawyers be unintimidatedfree to think, 
speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar.111  
The dissent rejected the officer of the court notion as dispositive 
of the instant case in the absence of an explanation of how 
Fiegers public statements were irreconcilable with that role.112 
Similarly, Judge Cavanagh did not understand vulgar or 
disrespectful speech to be inherently misleading.113 
The dissent condemned the majoritys glimpse into the 
likely future as nothing more than a scare tactic designed to 
conceal the fact that the ADBs decision merely maintained the 
status quo and did not, in fact, usher some Hobbesian legal 
culture into our jurisprudence.114 Judge Cavanagh opined that 
the majority melodramatically misrepresented Fieger as arguing 
that there can be no courtesy or civility rules at all of this sort, 
and wrongly faulted the dissent for its putative repudiation of 
courtesy and civility rules.115 The dissent contended that, 
[a]lthough the majority purport[ed] to recognize that lawyers 
have an unquestioned right to criticize the acts of courts and 
judges, and that there is no prohibition on a lawyers [sic] 
engaging in such criticism even during the pendency of a case, 
the majority nonetheless held that limitations [exist] . . . on the 
form and manner of such criticism.116 According to Judge 
Cavanagh, this revealed the majoritys core conception of 
                                                     
 110. Id. at 164. 
 111. Id. (quoting Konigsberg, 353 U.S. at 273). 
 112. Id. at 176. 
 113. See id. at 173 (stating that the majority is making a frightening judgment that 
speech itself is inherently misleading). 
 114. Id. at 176 (quoting the majority opinion). 
 115. Id. at 156 (quoting the majority opinion). 
 116. Id. at 174 (third alteration in original) (quoting the majority opinion). 
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professionalism for what it truly is: an attorney cannot use 
choice language to criticize a judge, ever.117 
B. How Important Is the First Amendment to Regulating Civility 
Within the Legal Profession? 
The hyperbolic characterizations of their opponents 
arguments as being, on the one hand, no valid civility rules can 
exist and, alternatively, no impolite criticisms of judges are 
allowed ever, are a manifestation of another basic area of 
disagreement between the majority and dissent: to what extent 
should First Amendment jurisprudence frame the debate about 
civility within the legal profession?118 The majority made crystal 
clear its refusal to allow First Amendment considerations to 
dominate its analysis. The Michigan Supreme Court perceives 
the paramount concern to be preserving respect for the judiciary 
and thereby ensuring the proper functioning of the system.119 The 
majority declared that: 
To disregard such interests in the pursuit of a conception of 
the First Amendment that has never been a part of our 
actual Constitution would in a real and practical sense 
adversely affect our rule of law, a no less indispensable 
foundation of our constitutional system than the First 
Amendment.120 
The dissent found it astounding[ ] that the majority would 
view the First Amendment as not part of our actual 
                                                     
 117. Id. 
 118. For a case addressing the intersection of the power of the courts to sanction 
lawyers or repress speech and lawyers First Amendment rights, see Gentile v. State Bar 
of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), finding that an attorneys speech during judicial 
proceedings may be subject to greater limitations than the speech of other citizens or the 
press, but that such limitations should be no broader than necessary to protect the 
integrity of the judicial system and the defendants right to a fair trial. Several cases have 
applied Gentile. See, e.g., In re Zeno, 504 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2007); Mezibov v. Allen, 
411 F.3d 712, 717 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 91 (3d Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1996); Hirschfeld v. Arpaio, No. 
98-15398, 1999 WL 311378, at *1 (9th Cir. May 7, 1999); In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134, 
139 (4th Cir. 1999); U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Wash. v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 
86566 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1993); In re 
Madison, 282 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Mo. 2009); In re Cobb, 838 N.E.2d 1197, 1211 (Mass. 
2005); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Profl Ethics & Conduct v. Visser, 629 N.W.2d 376, 
38081 (Iowa 2001); In re Inquiry of Broadbelt, 683 A.2d 543, 55152 (N.J. 1996); Idaho 
State Bar v. Topp, 925 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Idaho 1996); Twohig v. Blackmer, 918 P.2d 332, 
33637 (N.M. 1996); In re Coe, 903 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Mo. 1995); Colo. Supreme Court 
Grievance Comm. v. Dist. Court of Denver, Co., 850 P.2d 150, 151 n.2 (Colo. 1993). 
 119. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 13233 (discussing the substantial interests the 
civility rules are designed to further). 
 120. Id. at 132. 
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Constitution and be unable to conceive of the provision as 
protecting offensive attorney speech.121 According to this dissent, 
[s]uch protection has been lost because of the majoritys 
decision.122 For the dissent, the majoritys feverish invocation of 
the states authority to enact rules of professional conduct and 
protect the integrity of the judiciary overshadows the pivotal 
question, which is whether Michigans imposition of discipline 
infringed on the guarantees of the First Amendment.123 The 
federal district court agreed with the Michigan Supreme Courts 
dissent that the First Amendment analysis was the primary 
consideration because: 
[T]he vague and overbroad courtesy provisions[ ] that 
enforce silence in the name of preserving the dignity of the 
bench, do[ ] not override an attorneys right to speak her 
mind against public institutions, especially an elected 
judiciary, regardless of whether that speech is in good 
taste.124 
C. Is Incivility in the Legal Profession a Political Issue? 
The fact that Fiegers incivility was directed towards judges 
implicates a third issue dividing the Michigan Supreme Court 
majority and dissent.125 The majority and dissenting opinions 
evidenced differing degrees of sensitivity to the political 
dimensions of mandating that attorneys use polite and respectful 
speech when addressing or discussing members of a branch of a 
democratic government.126 This political dimension becomes 
apparent in two related, but distinct, aspects of the Michigan 
Supreme Courts analysis. The first is the question of whether 
Fiegers speech should be considered political speech for 
constitutional purposes.127 The second is whether the states 
                                                     
 121. Id. at 176 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 153. 
 123. Id. at 173. 
 124. Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, No. 06-11684, 2007 WL 2571975, at *2 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 4, 2007). 
 125. See Tresa Baldas, Lawyers Critical of Judges Fight For Rights, NATL L. J., Feb. 
9, 2009, at 4 (discussing the appropriateness of Fiegers and other attorneys critical 
comments about the judiciary). 
 126. Compare Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 140 (Not only was Mr. Fiegers speech not 
campaign speech, it was not political speech of any kind.), with id. at 167 (Cavanagh, J., 
dissenting) (This case . . . involves classic political speech.). For an example of how 
political agendas can affect legal ethics, see generally James E. Moliterno, Politically 
Motivated Bar Discipline, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 725, 72830 (2005) (describing various 
instances of the use of attorney discipline for political reasons). 
 127. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 13940 (addressing Fiegers argument that his 
comments were protected political speech); see also Tresa Baldas, Insulting Judges 
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actions in sanctioning Fieger for criticizing the judiciary have 
political implications.128 
As to the first issue, the majority rejected Fiegers argument 
that his remarks were political speech and, thus, fit within the 
most protected sphere of the First Amendment.129 Fieger argued 
that his criticisms of the judges warranted the same preferential 
treatment afforded campaign speech.130 In holding otherwise, the 
majority reasoned that the States interest in protecting the 
judiciary allowed Michigan to prohibit an attorneys speech 
critical of a public official unless the public official was facing 
reelection at the time the speech was made or the speech uttered 
was not discourteous or disrespectful.131 
Similarly, the court also refused to give Fiegers rude 
comments the broad protection extended to speech about public 
figures in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.132 In Sullivan, the 
Supreme Court held that a public figure could not recover 
damages for defamation in the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence that the offending statements were made with 
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard therefor.133 
The Michigan court did not find Sullivan instructive in any sense 
because it deemed the disciplinary and defamation contexts 
distinguishable.134 The majority did not perceive any similarities 
between sanctioning an attorney for rudely criticizing judges and 
assessing damages in defamation against a defendant who made 
false statements about a public figure.135 
While the dissent did not disagree that Fiegers comments 
were crude, Judge Cavanagh found them unmistakably political 
and, like the statements in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 
classic political speech.136 The Supreme Court has previously 
                                                     
Escalates into Speech Case, NATL L.J., Mar. 13, 2006, at 4 (Fiegers lawyer is quoted as 
saying Judges are government officials, and once we allow people to be harmed for 
criticizing government officials, weve lost . . . enormous . . . freedoms.). 
 128. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 13235 (discussing the states justification for 
limiting attorney criticism of judges). 
 129. Id. at 13940. 
 130. Id. at 139. 
 131. See id. at 13941, 14344. 
 132. Id. at 140 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 27980, 283 (1964)). 
 133. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 27980, 28586; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 342, 366 (1974) (stating that the standard set forth in Sullivan requires clear and 
convincing proof). 
 134. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 14041 (making the distinction between defamatory 
words in a media publication and abrasive language targeted at public official). 
 135. See id. at 141 (differentiating between a matter of professional discipline and 
the civil action involved in Sullivan). 
 136. Id. at 167 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (quoting Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 
U.S. 1030, 1034 (1991)). 
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made clear that speech critical of the exercise of the States 
power lies at the very center of the First Amendment.137 
Therefore, to the dissent, the commentary about the 
Badalamenti panel: 
[O]ccupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values, and is entitled to special 
protection. . . . [W]hen a government ventures into the 
perilous realm of restricting political speech, it must 
produce evidence of a state interest so significant that it 
fully justifies the otherwise forbidden endeavor of silencing 
those who desire to publicly find fault with the way in 
which the government conducts its affairs.138  
Judge Cavanagh believed the majority totally misunderst[ood] 
the nature of political speech[,] . . . disregard[ed] the entire body 
of law pertaining to it[,] . . . completely gut[ted] the First 
Amendment[,] and render[ed] an alarmingand, no doubt, 
singularholding.139 
To illustrate, the dissent pointed to the majoritys 
requirement that public officials must be facing reelection for 
statements about them to qualify as political speech and its 
general prohibition against lawyers making rude, vulgar, or 
disrespectful comments about judges outside the courtroom.140 The 
dissent argued that [n]either precept can be found in our First 
Amendment jurisprudence141 and did not accept that political 
hyperbole and satire should be limited to a campaign setting.142 
The offending statements in Fieger were criticisms of the character 
and competency of three members of the judiciary. To the 
Michigan Supreme Court dissent, Fiegers sole transgression was 
to complain publicly about a decision that Fieger believed 
unjustly divested his seriously injured client of a jury verdict.143 
Discerning the second political dimension of the Fieger cases 
necessitates shifting the focus away from the political nature or 
                                                     
 137. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1034. 
 138. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 16768 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (quoting Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252, 27071 (1941)). 
 139. Id. at 167. 
 140. See id. (asserting the seeming narrowness of the majoritys holding as applied to 
public officials up for reelection and citing speech that is not palatable to the majoritys 
sense of civility). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 197 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The dissent notes that the majority emphasized 
Fiegers references to the judges as Hitler, Goebbels, and Eva Braun, but observed 
that referring to political figures as Nazis is a common form of political satire. Id. at 197 
n.14. 
 143. Id. at 167 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
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content of Fiegers words and turning instead to consideration of 
the justification advanced by the state for repressing and 
sanctioning speech about government officials by certain citizens 
based on its character and content. Courts have affirmed such 
restrictions in two important and related categories: to preserve 
a partys right to a fair trial; and to preserve the integrity of the 
legal process and the publics respect for the institution.144 The 
majority conceded that there must be some justification beyond 
merely protecting judges from the robust criticism that is 
sometimes a part of the give-and-take of the democratic process 
or merely insulat[ing] judges from the inconvenience of being 
held accountable from their public actions.145 The court 
contended that by establishing rules prohibiting and sanctioning 
uncivil, disrespectful, and discourteous attorney conduct and 
speech, Michigan is protecting the ability of the judiciary to 
function properly and to play its role in preserving the rule of 
law.146 The purpose of civility codes, according to the majority, is 
not solely to safeguard the sensitivities of judges.147 The 
majority reasoned that a lawyers duty to maintain a respectful 
attitude toward the courts is necessary to preserve the publics 
confidence in the integrity of the legal system, which might 
otherwise be unjustifiably undermined.148 The rules, according to 
the majority, are, therefore, not for the sake of the temporary 
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its 
supreme importance.149 
The dissents response to that argument was that concern 
about behavior and speech that may engender public 
disrespect for the judiciary as a whole is not, in and of itself, 
an adequate justification for restricting attorneys First 
Amendment rights.150 Unless the incivility occurs in the 
courtroom, and hence, in connection with a particular 
proceeding, First Amendment jurisprudence requires courts to 
weigh the states interest in its professional regulation against 
a lawyers First Amendment interest in the kind of speech at 
                                                     
 144. Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, No. 06-11684, 2007 WL 2571975, at *34 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 4, 2007). 
 145. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 132. 
 146. Id. at 13233. 
 147. Id. at 133. 
 148. Id. at 13233. 
 149. Id. at 133 (quoting Ginger v. Culehan, 116 N.W.2d 216, 218 (1962)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 150. See id. at 168 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (stating that protecting the 
judiciary . . . has consistently been rejected as an interest substantial enough to curtail 
First Amendment freedoms). 
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issue.151 The dissents baseline principle was that attorneys 
can publicly criticize the judiciary and cannot be punished for 
such speech, no matter how crass, when the criticisms do not 
affect the decorum of the tribunal or substantially prejudice 
the administration of justice.152 
 The dissent and the federal district court agreed that a 
lawyer, like any other citizen, has an absolute . . . right to speak 
and write as he wishes[,] . . . to say anything . . . he believes to be 
true,153 and to castigate courts and their administration of 
justice154 anywhere other than the courtroom.155 Thus, the 
dissent concluded that Fiegers remarks could not be punished 
because the majority failed to identify an unassailable 
connection between Fiegers vulgar and insulting speech, and 
prejudice to the administration of justice.156 
The majority also identified a related interest of the states: 
their desire to have a court system in which the public is not 
misled by name-calling and vulgarities from lawyers who are 
held to have special knowledge of the courts.157 Judge 
Cavanagh called this statement presumptuous and insulting to 
the intellect of our citizenry, and inferred that the majority 
believes that citizens are unable to think for themselves 
[or] . . . engage in critical thinking when faced with divergent 
viewpoints, [and] need the state to protect them from what the 
majority perceives may mislead them.158 The majority assumed 
that judges might be reluctant to mete out evenhanded 
decisions . . . [if they] fear[ed] . . . vulgar characterizations of 
their actions, and cast this concern as a legitimate state 
interest that overrides First Amendment rights.159 The dissent 
regarded this assertion as a sad and, presumably, misguided 
commentary on the ability of our judges to elevate their duties 
                                                     
 151. See id. at 198 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Fiegers case from other 
First Amendment civility cases because the statements in question were made after his 
case was decided). 
 152. Id. at 177 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 153.  Id. at 17677 (quoting In re Ronwin, 667 P.2d 1281, 1288 (Ariz. 1983)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 154. Id. at 176 (quoting Commn for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 
430 (Tex. 1998)); see Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, No. 06-11684, 2007 WL 2571975, at 
*12 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2007) (agreeing that an attorney has a right to criticize public 
institutions outside the courtroom). 
 155  Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 176 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Ronwin, 667 
P.2d at 1288) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156. Id. at 177. 
 157. Id. at 132 (majority opinion). 
 158. Id. at 173 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 159. Id. at 132 (majority opinion). 
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over their feelings and to maintain neutrality in the face of 
inevitable criticism.160 
The dissent advanced a contrary characterization of judges 
as having thick skins and needing no protection from criticism, 
other than malicious defamation.161 As the federal district court 
pointed out, the law gives judges as persons, or courts as 
institutions . . . no greater immunity from criticism than other 
persons or institutions.162 Justice Cavanagh further argues this 
position:  
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be 
won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly 
appraises the character of American public opinion. For it is 
a prized American privilege to speak ones mind, although 
not always with perfect good taste, on all public 
institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, 
solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, 
would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and 
contempt much more than it would enhance respect. 
. . . 
Danger of unbridled exercise of judicial power because of 
immunity from speech which is coercing is a figment of 
groundless fears. In addition to the internal censor of 
conscience, professional standards, the judgment of fellow 
judges and the bar, the popular judgment exercised in 
elections, the power of appellate courts, including this 
Court, there is the corrective power of the press and of 
public comment free to assert itself fully immediately upon 
completion of judicial conduct.163 
 
Fiegers response to the appellate opinion was unsurprising 
given his well-known long-continued militancy in the field of 
litigation for injured plaintiffs.164 The public, according to the 
dissent, would most likely evaluate his vulgar criticisms of the 
judges in the Badalamenti case with no prejudice to the fair 
administration of justice or the reputations of the judges 
involved.165 Restrictions on public comment are invalid unless the 
serious substantive evil of unfair administration of justice is a 
                                                     
 160. Id. at 173 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. (quoting In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 845 (Mo. 1991) (Blackmar, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
 162.  Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, No. 06-11684, 2007 WL 2571975, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 4, 2007) (quoting Landmark Commcns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978)). 
 163. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 16869 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 172 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941)). 
 165. See id. at 171 (discussing the publics right to be informed of the judiciary). 
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likely consequence.166 Protecting the judiciary from derision has 
been held not to meet this standard, and the dissent did not 
believe the constitutional standard was met by Michigan in 
Fieger.167 As the ADB has explained (and the dissent agreed): 
Few if any members of the Michigan judiciary will be cowed 
by such outbursts. . . . [O]ur system of justice is not put at 
risk if these statements are not censored. The public and 
the profession can express their revulsion at such crudity, 
while at the same time feeling pride in belonging to a 
society that allows its expression. If we write rules 
governing speech to quell such antics, then we will have 
truly lost our bearings. The judiciary is not so fragile. It is 
the First Amendment that needs protection.168 
The dissents criticism of the majoritys approach to attorney 
incivility was not, however, based solely on the absence of a 
required showing that Fiegers speech would likely have a 
substantial impact on the administration of justice in a particular 
case.169 Another weakness the dissent identified was the majoritys 
apparent failure to apprehend any potential benefits from public 
criticism of the judiciary by lawyers.170 Lawyers, by virtue of their 
education and experience, are uniquely qualified to evaluate and 
critique the performance of judges. Some courts have predicted 
that preventing lawyers from performing this function by 
repressing critical speech, however uncivil it may be, may have 
unintended, deleterious effect[s] upon the publics perception of 
the legal system.171 In addition, courts have also acknowledged 
that an attorneys public comments about a pending case can be 
part of a lawyers competent and zealous representation of a client 
                                                     
 166. See id. at 168 (quoting Bridges, 314 U.S. at 270) (commenting on how rules that 
shackl[e] the right to freely express opinion can be justified). In promoting the first 
interest, attorney speech is subject to more limitations based on a less stringent standard, 
substantial likelihood of material[ ] prejudic[e]. Fieger, 2007 WL 2571975, at *34. If the 
restrictions are to preserve judicial integrity, however, attorney speech should be subject 
to restriction based on a higher standard. 
 167. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 16869 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
protecting the judiciary from criticism is not a valid reason for restricting free 
speech). 
 168. Fieger, No. 94-186-GA, at 32 (Mich. Atty Discipline Bd. Sept. 2, 1997), available 
at http://www.adbmich.org/coveo/opinions/1997-09-02-94-186a.pdf. 
 169. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 171 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (admonishing the 
majoritys finding that Fiegers comments were made during a pending case and therefore 
negatively impacted the administration of justice). 
 170. See id. at 17172 (detailing the importance of public interest and comment in 
judicial actions). 
 171. See, e.g., Fieger, 2007 WL 2571975, at *1; Bridges, 314 U.S. at 27071 ([A]n 
enforced silence . . . solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench[ ] would probably 
engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.). 
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by, for example, swaying the court of public opinion by countering 
adverse publicity; . . . gathering crucial evidence; . . . encouraging 
settlement; . . . and engaging the public in discourse surrounding 
the issues of import in the particular case.172 
The judges who overturned the jury verdict in Badalamenti 
were an integral part of a branch of government which plays a 
critical role in a democracy and upon which is conferred unique 
powers, significant influence, and considerable insulation from 
scrutiny and accountability.173 The dissent warned that it is not 
uncommon for courts to act arbitrarily, and if lawyers are unable 
to inform the public of these transgressions, the publics ability to 
temper the judiciary will be compromised.174 Turning to Justice 
Frankfurter: 
There have sometimes been martinets upon the bench 
as there have also been pompous wielders of authority who 
have used the paraphernalia of power in support of what 
they called their dignity. Therefore judges must be kept 
mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate public 
responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed 
with candor however blunt.175 
The dissent posited that speech concerning public affairs is more 
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.176 That 
perspective, coupled with the realization that discipline by the 
Bar results from an unusual concentration of power in one 
branch of government: [because] the Michigan Supreme Court in 
effect makes, enforces, and interprets the laws relating to the 
criticism of its members for some commentators militates 
against expansive interpretations of civility codes and counsels 
skepticism in evaluating claims of harm to the judiciary.177 
D. Can Civility Be Narrowly Defined?  
The fourth and final dispute between the majority and 
dissent in the Fieger Michigan Supreme Court case was whether 
provisions prohibiting incivility, discourtesy, and disrespect, 
                                                     
 172. Fieger, 2007 WL 2571975, at *3 (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not 
Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859 (1998)). 
 173. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 171 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
because the judiciary is conferred these crucial responsibilities, the public should not be 
denied its right to temper this institution). 
 174. See id. at 16972 (explaining that the corrective power of the public and the 
press serves as a fundamental balance to unbridled judicial power). 
 175. Id. at 17172 (quoting Bridges, 314 U.S. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
 176. Id. at 16768 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 7475 (1964)). 
 177. Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955, 977 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, 
J., dissenting). 
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in these general terms, are, or can be, defined in a manner that 
gives lawyers adequate notice of prohibited behavior.178 The 
majority, of course, deemed the courtesy provisions in MRPC 
3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a) as narrow and carefully tailored 
regulations that are necessary adjuncts to a responsible legal 
system and are compatible with the First Amendment.179 The 
dissent accused the majority of deciding a question not before it 
in order to create a sweeping and troubling expansion of the 
MRPC and an unconstitutional blanket prohibition on 
discourteous and undignified speech that allows repression 
and punishment of truthful and innocuous statements.180 
The majority rejected Fiegers argument that Michigans 
civility rules are unconstitutionally vague because they do not 
give lawyers sufficient notice of what speech is prohibited.181 Its 
defense of the rules is based on two assertions: the rules do not 
prohibit criticism of judges; and words such as discourtesy and 
disrespect do not require more specific definition in the context 
of attorney regulation.182 The dissent disputes both of these 
claims.183 
As to the first defense, the majority states that the rules are 
a call to discretion and civility, not to silence or censorship, 
and they do not even purport to prohibit criticism.184 The court 
interprets MRPC 3.5(c) as precluding criticism only if a lawyer 
uses undignified or discourteous conduct toward the tribunal.185 
All other forms of critical remarks are allowed, and therefore, 
give lawyers an alternative avenue of expression as the First 
Amendment requires.186 In support, the majority points to the 
comment to MRPC 3.5 and states [a]s should be clear, these 
rules are designed to prohibit only undignified, discourteous, 
                                                     
 178. Compare Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 139 (asserting that the language of the 
Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct adequately put Fieger on notice that his 
egregious conduct and speech was prohibited), with id. at 195 (Kelly, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing that the Rules provided adequate notice to Fieger and instead concluding 
that they are constitutionally vague). 
 179. Id. at 132 (majority opinion). In F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to address the First Amendment issues raised by a statutory 
provision that prohibits any . . . indecent . . . language. F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1803, 1819 (2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006)). 
 180. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 15354, 17677 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. at 139 (majority opinion). 
 182. Id. at 135, 139. 
 183. Id. at 15657 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); id. at 19395 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. at 135 (majority opinion). 
 185. Id. at 134 (quoting MICH. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.5(c) (2009), available 
at http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/pdfs/mrpc.pdf.). 
 186. See id. (citing MICH. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.5(c) cmt. (2009), available 
at http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/pdfs/mrpc.pdf). 
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and disrespectful conduct or remarks.187 The Fieger courts 
confidence that the courtesy rules, despite their lack of explicit 
definitions, pose no threat to criticism of the judiciary seems to 
be based primarily on the efficacy of the statement to that effect 
in the rule. The Sixth Circuit majority implicitly accepted this 
rationale by emphasizing that Fiegers punishment was based 
upon his utterance of vulgar, personally abusive comments 
about participants in a pending case, not because he criticized or 
disagreed with the judges.188 
The dissent countered that because lawyers have a due 
process right to receive notice of prohibited conduct; the absence 
of notice can render even a rule of professional responsibility 
unconstitutionally vague.189 Such notice, according to Judge 
Cavanagh, is absent in Fieger because of the reality that many 
trials and other proceedings are subject to public discussion and 
analysis after their conclusion, and nothing in Michigans rules 
suggests that persons involved in the legal process may not be 
criticized for their roles, especially after their involvement in the 
proceedings has ceased.190 
The dissent charged that the majority opinion substituted 
conclusions and assurances for analysis, falsely maintained that 
the civility rules are narrowly drawn, and then gave the rules 
an even narrower construction.191 The majority was convinced 
that the Michigan civility rules do not chill the speech of 
attorneys who wish to criticize judges and will not be used by 
disciplinary authorities to punish such speech because the rules 
say they should not be used in such a manner.192 The dissents in 
both the Michigan Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit cases 
countered by arguing that declarations that the rules are 
narrowly tailored does not make them so.193 Moreover, Michigan 
                                                     
 187. Id. at 135. 
 188. Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955, 964 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 189. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 19495 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 190. See id. at 164 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (advocating the ADB lead opinion in 
showing that the majoritys interpretation would encompass critical comments made 
throughout an individuals role in the justice system). 
 191. See id. at 156, 169 (criticizing the majority for haphazardly drawing 
conclusions and expanding the MPRC without any regard for the plain language, history, 
or context of the rules). 
 192. See id. at 135, 14344 (majority opinion) (The limited restriction placed by the 
rules on Mr. Fiegers speech is narrowly drawn and is no greater than is necessary to 
maintain . . . the integrity of [the] legal system.). 
 193. See id. at 169 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (stating that the majoritys claim that 
the rules are narrowly drawn is without support); Fieger, 553 F.3d at 975 (Merritt, J., 
dissenting) (stating that although the majority emphasized the narrow construction given 
to the MRPC, such an interpretation was not credible). 
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did not carry its burden, according to the dissents in these 
courts, of showing that its rules authorized no unnecessary 
interference with the First Amendment rights of lawyers.194 
Instead, the majority interpret[ed] these rules with a brush so 
broad as to now encompass any offensive language used to 
criticize a judge.195 
The Michigan Supreme Court majority did not define the 
descriptive and operative words undignified, discourteous, 
and disrespectful in more detail because of Fiegers stipulation 
to accept discipline to facilitate an appellate challenge and the 
courts conclusion that his remarks indisputably violated the 
rule.196 The courts argument seems to be that the rule is 
constitutionally sound on its face because in this case: 
[T]here is no question that even the most casual reading of 
these rules would put a person clearly on notice that the 
kind of language used by Mr. Fieger would violate MRPC 
3.5(c) and MRPC 6.5(a). To invite the sodomization of a 
judge, with a clients finger, a plunger, or his own fist, and 
to invite a judge to kiss ones ass are statements that do not 
come close to the margins of the civility or courtesy 
rules.197 
 In addition, the majority alluded to the construction of 
Michigans civility provision that is narrowly drawn and is no 
greater than is necessary to maintain this states . . . interests in 
the integrity of its legal system.198 The court further presupposed 
that Michigan lawyers will be able to perceive the boundary 
                                                     
 194. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 16869 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (asserting that the 
government has an obligation to prove that rules limiting free speech do not cause 
unnecessary interference with the First Amendment); see also Fieger, 553 F.3d at 97677 
(Merritt, J., dissenting) (criticizing the vagueness of the Michigan Supreme Courts 
construction of the rules, in addition to the expansive application of the rules without any 
precedent). 
 195. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 156 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 196. Id. at 131, 139 (majority opinion). 
 197. Id. The Sixth Circuit accepted the Michigan Supreme Court majoritys 
reasoning in its analysis of the standing issue: 
  In light of the narrowing construction placed on the rules by the Michigan 
Supreme Court in Fieger, the courts acknowledgment that lawyers have a right 
to criticize judges generally, and Fiegers extreme remarks about participants in 
a pending case, for which he stipulated that reprimand was warranted, it is 
incumbent upon plaintiffs to articulate something more than a generalized, 
subjective chilling of speech to establish the required injury-in-fact. . . . Thus, 
the purported chilling effect of the rules on plaintiffs and on Michigan 
attorneys, in light of the narrow construction placed on those rules and Fiegers 
extreme behavior, is objectively unsubstantiated and, accordingly, fails to give 
rise to an injury-in-fact. 
Fieger, 553 F.3d at 965. 
 198. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 143. 
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between courteous and discourteous criticism by virtue of 
their Bar membership.199  
The dissent conceded that speech restrictions based on 
language that teeter[s] on the edge of vagueness have been 
saved when the troublesome words or phrases have been subject 
to sufficient interpretation to provide the constitutionally 
required notice that is not inherent in the language itself.200 The 
majority, however, did not point to any narrowing constructions 
by courts. Instead, as Judge Merritt posits in his Sixth Circuit 
dissent, the majority simply asserted that the rules are meant to 
apply only to vulgar, crude, or personally abusive remarks.201 
This approach missed the point of a vagueness challenge, 
according to the Sixth Circuit dissent.202 The flaw in the Michigan 
Supreme Court majoritys analysis was its failure to identify, 
with greater specificity, speech to which the rules do not apply.203 
The federal district court derided the Michigan Supreme 
Court majoritys directive that lawyers are free to criticize 
judges, but only in a courteous and respectful manner, as an 
invitation to arbitrary and selective enforcement.204 In making 
the point that a person of ordinary intelligence would not 
necessarily know what these rules mean, the court recounted the 
following exchange: 
[A] Michigan State Senator, who happens to be an attorney, 
made certain comments about a federal judge stating that 
he was out of control, [and] not quite lucid . . . . During 
oral argument [in Fieger], the assistant Attorney General 
for the State of Michigan was asked . . . whether she 
believed that these comments violated the courtesy 
                                                     
 199. See id. at 144 (quoting In re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 88 (Ohio 1909)) (An attorney 
of more than twenty years standing at the bar must be presumed to know the difference 
between respectful . . . criticism, and scandalous abuse.). The court recognized that this 
code is complex, but apparently did not perceive any potential conflict between its 
directive that lawyers behave courteously and some of the other provisions of the codes of 
professional responsibility such as the requirement that lawyers be competent and 
zealous advocates for their clients. See id. at 143 (noting that the MRPC only prevent 
lawyers from casting such disagreement and criticism in terms that could only bring 
disrepute on the legal system, not general disagreement). 
 200. Id. at 160 n.7 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 201. See Fieger, 553 F.3d at 975 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority 
opinion) (admonishing the majority for claiming to emphasize a narrow construction of 
the MRPC, which the dissent found impossible); id. at 965 (majority opinion) (observing 
that plaintiffs did not suggest any other attorneys intended to make vulgar, crude, or 
personally abusive remarks). 
 202. Id. at 97576 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 203. Id. at 976. 
 204. Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, No. 06-11684, 2007 WL 2571975, at *1112 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2007). 
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provisions. Her initial response was, I dont know . . . I 
need a more specific context to address that . . . .205 
Critics of the courtesy rules also posed this question: Is a lawyer, 
for example, allowed to say that a judge behaved 
dictatorially[,] . . . is a jackass[,] . . . a stubborn idiot, a right-wing 
radical, a doctrinaire ideologue[,] . . . driven by party 
politics, . . . or an incompetent jurist whose presence on the bench 
is a disgrace?206 The federal district court further illustrated the 
vagueness and shapelessness of the majoritys approach by 
asking how each of the following statements would be treated 
under Michigans rules: 
• Todays ruling by the Court was a travesty of 
justice . . . . 
• . . . I believe that the Supreme Court is in the back 
pocket of special interest groups. 
• Like the Oracle [of Delphi], you too must have been 
inhaling the intoxicating vapors when writing this 
decision. 
• [This opinion] makes [one] wonder if the members of 
the court actually went to law school. 
• Three monkeys with typewriters could have written 
a more coherent opinion . . . . 
• Something should be done to those Judges.207 
In addition to the assertion that the Michigan rules were 
narrowly constructed for the reasons previously stated, the 
majority also pointed to two other ways in which the scope of 
the rules was limited in Fieger: they were applied to a pending 
case and to remarks directed towards a tribunal. Fiegers radio 
comments were made immediately after the appellate court 
published its opinion, but prior to the expiration of the time 
during which the parties could have moved the court for 
reconsideration or rehearing. Based on this fact, the majority 
concluded that the Badalamenti case was still pending and 
Fiegers comments were, thus, made during the course of 
ongoing litigation. In order to reach this conclusion, the 
majority, ironically, had to define during and pending case 
in very broad terms to include cases begun, but not yet 
completed, and awaiting an occurrence or conclusion of [the] 
                                                     
 205. Id. at *11. 
 206. Fieger, 553 F.3d at 976 (Merritt, J., dissenting); see Baldas, supra note 127, at 4 
(quoting Fiegers lawyer as saying, [W]hat did he do that was so terrible? He made some 
uncharitable comments about a couple of judges in the course of a radio program). 
 207. Fieger, 2007 WL 2571975, at *1112. 
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action and time periods before the conclusion of, and prior to 
the completion of, cases and periods of continuance or 
indeterminancy.208 
To the dissent, it was significant for purposes of assessing the 
overbreadth and vagueness challenges to the courtesy rules that 
the majoritys opinion never actually limited, in general, the reach 
of the speech restrictions to pending cases, but instead merely 
relied upon a finding that Fiegers comments were made while 
that case was pending in its defense to charges that the rules were 
being applied unconstitutionally.209 In other words, the court, 
according to the dissent, did not state unequivocally that the rules 
do not reach nonpending cases. Moreover, according to the dissent, 
the majoritys construction of the pending case requirement was 
reached haphazardly and without any regard for the plain 
language, history, or context of the rules.210 Convinced that the 
rules were not intended to reach the type of speech involved in 
Fieger, the dissent believed the court expanded the reach of the 
courtesy rules in order to sanction Fieger.211 Judge Cavanagh 
would take counsel from Justice Frankfurters dissent in Bridges, 
a case in which the Court considered whether speech that occurred 
between trial and sentencing prejudiced the fair administration of 
justice.212 Justice Frankfurter distinguished cases awaiting 
decisions from those which are not: 
   The question concerning the narrow power we recognize 
always iswas there a real and substantial threat to the 
impartial decision by a court of a case actively pending 
before it? The threat must be close and direct; it must be 
directed towards a particular litigation. The litigation must 
be immediately pending. When a case is pending is not a 
technical, lawyers problem, but is to be determined by the 
substantial realities of the specific situation.213 
                                                     
 208. Grievance Admr v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 136 (Mich. 2006). 
 209. See id. at 166 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majoritys broad 
interpretation of the term pending will lead to incongruous results in non-Court of 
Appeals cases); see also Fieger, 553 F.3d at 977 n.2. (Merritt, J., dissenting) (contending 
that an expansive reading of the majoritys opinion may restrict a lawyers freedom of 
speech in nonpending cases as well). 
 210. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 156 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 211. See id. at 156, 161, 166 (arguing the majority abruptly change[d] the rule and 
pointing repeatedly to the lack of support for their view). 
 212. Id. at 169. 
 213. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 30304 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). Judge Cavanagh disputed whether speech restrictions should be 
allowed even if the case is still pending, as he explains: 
[E]ven if one were to accept the majoritys precarious conclusion that the 
Badalamenti case was pending, its end result that the comments were not 
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To the contrary, the majoritys interpretation of the rule will 
equate a recent appellate decision and an ongoing trial for 
purposes of the applicability of the courtesy rules, so long as the 
time for filing a motion for leave to appeal further has not 
expired. The dissent pointed out that in order to reach the 
pending case issue in the first place, the majority had to give a 
similarly expansive interpretation to another provision in the 
rules.214 The Michigan Supreme Court held that the phrase all 
persons involved in the legal process in MRPC 6.5(a) included 
judges in order to find that they are persons who must be treated 
with courtesy and respect under the rule.215 The dissent argued 
that this particular disciplinary rule had never previously been 
applied to an attorneys public comments about a judge after an 
appellate ruling.216 
In addition to its finding that the Badalamenti case was still 
pending when Fieger made his critical remarks, the majority also 
held they were directed toward a tribunal, which was an 
explicit predicate to the imposition of sanctions under the rule.217 
The court characterized Fiegers statements, even though made 
outside a courtroom for a radio audience, as attacking the judges 
in their professional capacity and in a forum designed to reach 
both the public and the[ ] judges who might have been members 
of the audience.218 The court held that [Fiegers] comments were 
in the direction of and with respect to these judges, and 
therefore, were necessarily comments made toward the 
                                                     
protected is irreconcilable with the basic truth that even restrictions on speech 
regarding pending cases merit the most careful scrutiny. . . . Protections for 
speech about pending cases are no less vital because pending cases are likely to 
fall not only at a crucial time but upon the most important topics of discussion, 
and [n]o suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there 
guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and 
importance of the ideas seeking expression. Indeed, public interest in a pending 
matter and the importance of disseminating information in a timely manner are 
at a pinnacle while the matter is ongoing. Moreover, negating constitutional 
restraints on limiting speech about pending matters would disregard, at the 
expense of free speech, that cases, especially in todays overburdened legal 
system, frequently remain unresolved for extended periods. 
Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 171 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (quoting Bridges, 314 U.S. at 26869) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 214. Id. at 16264 (explaining that the majoritys reading of MPRC 3.5(a) was a 
similarly expansive interpretation as that given to MPRC 6.5(a)). 
 215. See id. at 138 (majority opinion) (asserting that MRPC 6.5(a) applies to judges 
involved in an current legal proceeding). 
 216. See id. at 174 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (noting that the majoritys reliance on 
an ethical rule supposedly prohibiting nondefamatory, rude remarks was untried 
constitutionally). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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tribunal.219 The court rejected the argument that an attorneys 
speech cannot be suppressed or punished in the absence of a 
finding that the speech could actually disrupt the proceeding.220 
Further, the court found that such a requirement was contrary to 
the explicit language of the rule and that the ADB did not have 
the power to declare a court-enacted professional rule of conduct 
unconstitutional.221 The court equated the necessity of an actual 
threat of disruption of a case with adding a requirement that the 
discourteous conduct occur in the courtroom and reasoned that 
limiting the applicability of the courtesy rule in this manner 
would render the rule largely superfluous, and of little practical 
utility.222 The court based this conclusion on the assumption that 
the statutory power to hold lawyers in contempt for violating 
court orders gives judges all of the power necessary to reach any 
misconduct that could disrupt a tribunal.223 
The dissents interpretation of the towards the tribunal 
language is contrary to the majoritys construction in almost 
every respect. The dissent argued that the plain language of the 
phrase, when viewed in a context that includes consideration of 
its historical evolution, makes clear that the toward the 
tribunal limitation should be read to narrow the scope of the 
rule to reach only conduct that occurs proximate in time and 
space to the tribunal or its immediate environs, such as judicial 
chambers or in pleadings.224 This construction is bolstered by the 
comment to MRPC 3.5, which indicates that the rule was drafted 
with the intent to promote the specific interest of protecting 
litigants rights to fair trials.225 In the ordinary course of events, 
                                                     
 219. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 13738 (majority opinion). 
 222. Id. at 137. 
 223. Id.; see Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 98991 (1997) (holding that a lawyer 
who engages in contumacious conduct, disruptive of judicial proceedings and damaging to 
the courts authority may be punished summarily without normal due process, even if 
misconduct was not pervasive or disrespectful). But see In re Jefferson, 657 S.E.2d 830, 
833 (Ga. 2008) (holding that a court must show that an attorneys statements and conduct 
actually interfered with, or posed an imminent threat of interfering with, the 
administration of justice and that the attorney knew or should have known that the 
statements or conduct were out of bounds before a court may sanction an attorney 
summarily for contempt); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 105 
cmt. e & reporters note to cmt. e (2000) (expressing the view that a lawyer should not be 
punished summarily for contempt unless the conduct constitutes an obstruction of 
justice). 
 224. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 157 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 225. MICH. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.5 cmt. (2009), available at 
http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/pdfs/mrpc.pdf; see Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 15859 
(Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (arguing that the MRPC comment supports the inference that 
the rule is limited to remarks made toward the tribunal). 
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conduct or speech outside a courtroom, like Fiegers, does not 
disrupt, or pose a serious threat of disrupting, a court 
proceeding.226 According to the dissent, [t]he majoritys removal 
of the proximate element of this rule gives courts the 
unconstitutional power to protect the sensitivities of judges by 
restricting a lawyers ability to speak even when the speech 
occurs in a setting removed in time and space from a judicial 
proceeding.227 The district court worried that the Michigan 
Supreme Courts holding would extend the suppression of speech 
all the way to extrajudicial statements made on the proverbial 
street corner, at the meeting-hall, on the radio, in the newspaper 
and even [in] ones household.228 The dissent viewed such a 
broad interpretation of the civility rule as preventing lawyers 
from criticizing the conduct of judges even when the lawyers 
participation in the proceedings makes them particularly 
qualified to comment.229 Finally, the dissent argued that because 
the majoritys construction of the towards the tribunal 
language goes so far afield from protecting the citizenrys right 
to fair trials and impartial adjudications, and compelling 
evidence exists that the expansive interpretation is contrary to 
the rules plain language and its drafters intent, lawyers have 
not received notice sufficient to allow them to avoid the rules 
proscriptions.230 At a minimum, if the interpretation was at all 
doubtful, the dissent contends the more prudent path would 
have been to resolve the issue in favor of Fiegers First 
Amendment right to criticize the judiciary in a nondefamatory 
manner.231 
The split between the majority and dissent in the Michigan 
Supreme Court case mirrors a division in the holdings of courts 
that have considered whether the First Amendment protects 
attorneys from sanctions in situations similar to Fiegers.232 Not 
                                                     
 226. Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955, 977 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, 
J., dissenting) (As commentators have noted, [i]f a lawyer takes action outside a 
courtroom setting, it is virtually impossible that it could disrupt a tribunal. (quoting 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 31.6, at 31-12 (3d ed. 2004))). 
 227. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 157 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 228. Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, 2007 WL 2571975, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2007). 
 229. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 157 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
majoritys interpretation of the civility rules is aimed at protecting the feelings of judges 
at the expense of a lawyers constitutional rights). 
 230. Id. at 15960. 
 231. See id. at 160 (stating that any gray area should be resolved in favor of 
protecting Fiegers First Amendment rights). 
 232. Many courts have found First Amendment protections. See, e.g., Standing 
Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Green, 11 P.3d 
1078, 1086 (Colo. 2000); Ramsey v. Bd. of Profl Responsibility, 771 S.W.2d 116, 121 
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only have their respective legal arguments put them at odds in the 
courtroom, but the opinions in the Fieger cases also reflect contrary 
views of professionalism and civility in the legal profession.233  
The majoritys opinion in the Michigan Supreme Court case 
adheres to the classic notion. When lawyers become officers of 
the court they are versed in an unwritten code of behavior that 
obligates them to respect the judiciary and preserve the publics 
confidence in the integrity of the legal system.234 They do not need 
specific guidance about inappropriate behavior or language 
because they know where the boundaries are. A lawyers vulgar, 
insulting, discourteous, disrespectful language and acts towards 
the judiciary have no political content or value and pose an 
inherent threat to the rule of law.235 Such speech and behavior 
may be repressed and sanctioned without offense to the First 
Amendment because lawyers play a unique role in the legal 
system, may constitutionally be subjected to more expansive 
speech restrictions than non-lawyers, and always have an 
alternative avenue of expression available, i.e., courteous and 
respectful criticism.236 
From the other point of view, lawyers have the same rights 
to speak freely as other citizens and proper application of First 
Amendment case law should create a presumption against 
enforcement of courtesy codes.237 Their ethical duties of 
competency and zealous representation may compel lawyers to 
engage in behavior or to speak in a manner others find 
disrespectful or uncivil.238 Moreover, lawyers are uniquely 
qualified to comment on the performance of judges, and 
therefore, the state should not repress or punish their speech in 
particular.239 Criticizing the judiciary is an inherently political 
activity.240 Drafting rules that mandate courtesy and respect 
towards judges outside the courtroom in the name of 
professionalism is an unjustified intrusion into lawyers First 
                                                     
(Tenn. 1989); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Assn v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 966 (Okla. 1988). Other 
courts, however, have found that the First Amendment does not prevent sanctions. See, 
e.g., In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995); Miss. Bar v. Lumumba, 912 So.2d 
871, 883 (Miss. 2005); In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 838 (Mo. 1990) (en banc). 
 233. See Baldas, supra note 125, at 4 (addressing the legal professions debate about 
constitutional battles involving harsh criticism of judges). 
 234. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 13334. 
 235. See id. at 132, 14142. 
 236. See id. at 13435, 143. 
 237. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 172 (contending that courtesy rules are 
content-based restrictions and must pass the strict scrutiny standard). 
 238. See id. at 86771 (commenting on the important social value of attorney speech). 
 239. Butcher & Macbeth, supra note 96, at 673. 
 240. See Chemerinsky, supra note 172, at 863. 
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Amendment rights, not only because of the insufficiency of the 
notice provided by these vaguely-worded provisions, but also 
because the requisite threat to the fair administration of justice 
is absent.241 In any event, courtesy rules cannot be enforced fairly 
because they rely upon a nonexistent and unattainable consensus 
about appropriate speech and behavior.242 
The civility debate in case law appears to be at a stalemate 
of sorts between viewpoints that have proven difficult to 
reconcile, notwithstanding the plasticity of First Amendment 
precedent. For every point, there is a counterpoint.243 The classic 
professionalism paradigm, to its critics, manifests as little more 
than a jurisprudence of labels supported by tautological 
reasoning.244 Conversely, to professionalism advocates, 
misbehaving lawyers are attempting to use the First Amendment 
as a legal trump card in a cynical effort to avoid accountability, 
rather than vindicating their clients rights or improving the 
legal system.245 Some commentators on attorney speech issues 
attempt to bridge the wide gap between approaches like those of 
the majority and dissent in Fieger, by advocating tests that 
identify and balance the various interests at stake.246 In a 
                                                     
 241. See id. at 881, 88485. 
 242.  See, e.g., Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955, 97576 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(Merritt, J., dissenting) (questioning what speech establishes a definite violation of the 
MRPC, as the majority failed to suggest[ ] where the line between permissible and 
impermissible form might lie). 
 243. For example, one argument for protecting judges is that their code of ethics 
prohibits them from publicly defending themselves against criticism. See Grievance Admr 
v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 129 n.2 (Mich. 2006) (pointing out that a canon of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct prohibits judges from commenting on impending or pending cases). A 
responsive argument for not sanctioning lawyers for criticizing the judiciary is that 
lawyers cannot easily obtain appellate review of sanctions for incivility, which are often 
publicized in reported cases. See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 202, 208, 
210 (1999) (holding that an order imposing sanctions on an attorney is not immediately 
appealable); Carla R. Pasquale, Note, Scolded: Can an Attorney Appeal a District Courts 
Order Finding Professional Misconduct?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 219, 24244 (2008) 
(arguing that allowing appeals only for explicit and formal sanctions damages an 
attorneys reputation because sanctions are often published). 
 244. See Fieger, 553 F.3d at 976 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (asserting that words like 
undignified and discourteous have no clear meaning). 
 245. See Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 14043 (addressing how the protections afforded by 
the First Amendment should not permit attorneys to abuse their privileges through 
personal attacks on judges, but rather should allow the attorneys to advocate for their 
clients and uphold the law). 
 246. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 172, at 88587 (concluding that a 
lawyer should enjoy unrestricted freedom of speech unless he knows a statement is 
false and makes it with reckless disregard for the truth); Butcher & Macbeth, supra 
note 96, at 66780 (advocating the use of a subjective standard that balances the goal 
of protecting a lawyers ability to participate in public discourse with the need to 
defend the judiciary against false statements); David R. Cooper, Note, Speaking Out: 
Lawyers and Their Right to Free Speech, 18 REV. LITIG. 671, 683701 (1999) 
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factually distinguishable case, the U.S. Supreme Court took such 
an approach to attorney speech.247 As we shall see, however, for 
the reasons explained by the following sections, any 
conceptualization of attorney civility issues that relies exclusively 
on the language of law and the tools of legal analysis will be 
ideologically deficient, inherently unworkable, and incurably 
susceptible to prejudiced and arbitrary enforcement. 
V. THE UNCIVIL SOCIETY 
The exploration of incivility outside the legal profession 
ranges wide and deep. The meaning of civility has been the 
subject of extensive study and vigorous debate by historians, 
anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers, linguists, 
psychiatrists, and psychologists, among others.248 Legal 
scholarship frames civility as a principle tied to professional 
identity, i.e., the legal professions commitment to 
professionalism is its defining characteristic, and therefore, a 
commitment to professionalisms ideals, one of which is civility, 
is the defining characteristic of a good citizen of the Bar.249 
Insights from other, nonlegal studies suggest that the Bar 
should focus less on defending its incivility problem as a unique 
component of the legal profession and give greater consideration 
to the way these issues are framed in the society-wide debate 
about bad behavior.250 The sections that follow identify common 
themes that emerge from a broad range of civility scholarship 
and discuss their potential applicability to the legal profession. 
The discussion is organized around the three spheres within 
which notions of civility operate: personal, interpersonal, and 
societal. 
                                                     
(describing factors that should be weighed in determining if an attorneys speech 
should be sanctioned). 
 247. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1034, 1036 (1991) (setting out 
the requirement that courts balance the need for free and unfettered expression with 
the imminence and magnitude of the danger posed by the speech at issue). 
 248. Infra p. 1203. 
 249. Levine, supra note 12, at 22425 (describing Anthony Kronmans view that 
professionalism is at the core of the profession). 
 250. See generally Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyers Point of View, 
15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 209 (2003) (discussing the philosophical underpinnings of 
morality). But see Ted Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the 
Lawyers Point of View, 16 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 45, 45 (2004) (critiquing the work of 
Daniel Markovits, which couples a philosophic argument about legal ethics with a 
theory about long-term cultural trends and their effect on the profession . . . [and] 
purports to explain a commonly-observed crisis in todays legal profession that may be 
linked to other crises of moral justification . . . in the modern world (quoting 
Markovits, supra, at 211)). 
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A. Personal 
From a nonlegal perspective, a significant omission from the 
Bars incivility narrative is the role of emotions. Many, perhaps 
most, acts of rudeness, disrespect, discourtesy, and the like, are 
borne of an uncontrolled emotional reaction.251 Some recent 
research concludes that civility should be conceptualized as 
primarily about the means by which societies govern emotion.252 
The range of emotions implicated when a lawyer is vulgar, rude, 
discourteous, disrespectful, or the like include, among others, 
excitement, agitation, anger, sadness, fear, frustration, aggression, 
resentment, envy, disappointment, shame, and humiliation.253 A 
psychological perspective might conceptualize sanctions for 
breaching courtesy rules as punishment for a lawyers failure to 
control the inappropriate manifestations of his/her emotions.254 A 
shift in the direction of taking the emotional component of civility 
seriously would require the Bar and judiciary to look to experts in 
the mental health fields for guidance on when it is reasonable to 
expect lawyers to govern their emotions and when a failure to 
control emotions should be punishable.255 
Considering Fiegers outburst from a psychological point of 
view, it seems likely that his remarks were, at least in part, 
manifestations of the emotions of anger, frustration, 
disappointment, contempt, and aggression. These are feelings 
many plaintiffs lawyers would experience in the aftermath of 
an appellate reversal of a large verdict, coupled with a public 
condemnation of the lawyers trial tactics. Because these 
                                                     
 251. See NICO H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 29596 (1986) (linking violent displays of 
anger to feeling a loss of control). 
 252. See DAVETIAN, supra note 6, at 1718, 36263, 36970 (analyzing the 
relationship between culture and emotion and the effect this interaction has on civility). 
See generally THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR (Pierre Philippot, Robert S. 
Feldman & Erik J. Coats eds., 1999) (tracking theories that analyze the reciprocal 
relationship between nonverbal behavior and social variables); Dan Vergano, Study: 
Emotion Rules the Brains Decisions, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
tech/science/discoveries/2006-08-06-brain-study_x.htm (reporting the results of a study 
between healthy cognition and emotion and noting that [t]he evidence has been piling up 
throughout history, and now neuroscientists have proved its true: The brains wiring 
emphatically relies on emotion over intellect in decision-making). 
 253. See FRIJDA, supra note 251, at 29596 (discussing the types of expressive 
behavior associated with major emotions). 
 254. See id. at 40809 (relating emotional behavior to adverse consequences such as 
nonreward and punishment). 
 255. See generally Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 15, 1719 (1997) (discussing the applicability of therapeutic jurisprudence and 
preventive law perspectives to lawyering, which includes consideration of the mental 
health and psychological functioning of lawyers and clients). 
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feelings are nearly universal, the civility problem, from this 
point of view, is, in essence, about how to deal with the failures 
of some lawyers to control public manifestations of emotions 
that the Bar and judiciary deem professionally inappropriate or 
unacceptable. 
A fully-informed approach to incivility must take into 
consideration both the misbehaving lawyers state of mind and 
the circumstances surrounding the misconduct, including the 
existence of provocation. In Fiegers case, all conceded that his 
words were vulgar and offensive.256 In most cases, however, such 
concessions are unlikely and the proper characterization of the 
lawyers act or speech will not be clear-cut.257 In that event, 
according to this approach, the court should consider the lawyers 
psychological state as a relevant factor in determining whether 
the lawyers acts or words are disrespectful or offensive. 
To illustrate, consider whether a judge should sanction a 
lawyer for being discourteous or disrespectful in the following 
circumstances. Assume the lawyer addressed a middle-aged, 
African-American clerk of the court as Sparky.258 Would we 
condemn the act as disrespectful or offensive if we assumed that 
the lawyer had a good faith, but erroneous, belief that the clerks 
name was in fact Sparky?259 What if we assumed, in the 
alternative, that the lawyer and the clerk were involved in a 
dispute and the lawyer addressed the clerk as Sparky only after 
the clerk had called him a shyster? Is the lawyers tone of voice 
or physical posture relevant? Should the analysis change if the 
lawyer addressed the clerk as Chief instead of Sparky? What if 
the lawyer used the word Sparky to refer to the clerk in a 
dismissive tone of voice while muttering under his breath, 
believing no one would hear him? What if the lawyer knew the 
clerk was not named Sparky, and understood that the clerk 
would take offense at being addressed in this manner, but 
suffered from Tourettes syndrome, a mental condition that 
causes its sufferers to uncontrollably utter socially unacceptable 
                                                     
 256. See, e.g., Grievance Admr v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 141 (Mich. 2006); id. at 
157, 168 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); id. at 197 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 257. See infra Part V.B (explaining the inherent subjectivity of civility standards, 
making consensus and consistent application of any such standard almost 
unachievable). 
 258. See Attorney Grievance Commn of Md. v. Link, 844 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Md. 2004) 
(describing an incident in which an attorney called an African American customer service 
agent Sparky). 
 259. In the case upon which the hypothetical is loosely based, the lawyer did not 
believe that the clerks name was Sparky, and he also accused the clerk of being lazy 
and incompetent. Id. at 120001. 
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words and phrases?260 What if the lawyer suffered instead from 
bipolar mania but refused to take medication that would control 
his behavioral symptoms? What if the lawyer in any of the 
foregoing examples manifested genuine remorse and apologized 
immediately? 
Psychologists and other medical scientists assess rude and 
disruptive acts and behaviors in light of emerging knowledge about 
impulsivity, anger, and power-seeking and autonomy-preserving 
behaviors.261 Looking at attorney misconduct from such a 
perspective suggests consideration of, at a minimum, a rude 
lawyers intent to harm, her emotional motivations, the 
existence of provocation, and the harm inflicted on others. The 
modern psychological sensibility is to think of controlling ones 
emotions and behavior as facets of mental health.262 Outside of 
admissions decisions and assessments of the appropriate 
sanction in disciplinary actions, the Bar has been slow in this 
context to embrace available insights from psychology, 
psychiatry, and other mental health fields, preferring instead to 
see civility issues as primarily questions of character or 
adherence to the legal professions officer of the court 
unwritten code.263 
Taking into account psychological factors affecting behavior 
is, however, fraught with difficulties and ambiguities.264 While 
the problems mentally ill attorneys pose for the legal profession 
                                                     
 260. Cf. Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187, 279 & n.486 (2005) (noting a similar scenario 
where a grocery store bagger with autism, which hindered social interaction and made 
him speak loudly, could not be discharged when he otherwise properly performed the 
essential functions of the job). 
 261. Cf. James J. Gross & Ricardo F. Muñoz, Emotion Regulation and Mental 
Health, 2 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC. 151 (1995) (weighing the issue of whether or 
not aggressive emotional outburst are or are not controllable). 
 262. Id. at 15455. 
 263. See Jane H. Herrick, Misconduct, Mental State and Mitigation: The Developing 
Role of Mental State, Condition, or Impairment in Kentucky Lawyer Discipline, 6 
APPALACHIAN J.L. 31, 4546 (2006) (observing that an attorneys mental state cannot be a 
full bar against liability in disciplinary proceeding); John V. Jacobi, Professionalism and 
Protection: Disabled Lawyers and Ethical Practice, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 567, 58788 (2008) 
(using the methods the medical profession employs as a starting point for how the legal 
profession should deal with impaired attorneys); Michael L. Perlin, Baby, Look Inside 
Your Mirror: The Legal Professions Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental 
Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 59495 (2008) (arguing that the legal profession 
ignores mental illness in its ranks); Page Thead Pulliam, Comment, Lawyer Depression: 
Taking a Closer Look at First-Time Ethics Offenders, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 289, 291 (2008) 
(calling into question the ABAs failure to fully appreciate the effects of mental illness on 
attorneys). 
 264. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 03-431, at 3 
(2003) (acknowledging that lawyers are not health care professionals and cannot be 
expected to discern mental illness as would a professional). 
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share some similarities with those created by substance abuse, 
they are, from a practical standpoint, far more complex.265 For 
example, consider bipolar disorder, one of a number of mental 
illnesses where impulsivity and acting out are symptoms.266 An 
attorney suffering from untreated mania might repeatedly 
engage in conduct most would deem offensive, impolite, 
disruptive, and disrespectful.267 In many jurisdictions, if a lawyer 
evidenced a recurrent problem with alcohol or drug abuse that 
resulted in inappropriate speech or behavior, the Bar, judges, or 
perhaps his/her peers could intervene, often in advance of 
disciplinary action. Although some jurisdictions include mental 
illness as a basis for referring a lawyer to a diversion-type 
program for assistance from the Bar, most do not.268 If one agrees 
                                                     
 265. See Kristy N. Bernard & Matthew L. Gibson, Comment, Professional 
Misconduct by Mentally Impaired Attorneys: Is There a Better Way to Treat an Old 
Problem?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619, 630 (2004) (noting the unfairness in arbitrarily 
sanctioning attorneys with undiagnosed but easily treatable conditions); Len Klingen, 
Comment, The Mentally Ill Attorney, 27 NOVA L. REV. 157, 160 (2002) (noting that drug 
addictions are often included when discussing mental illness of attorneys, both because 
they are thought of as mental disorders and because they can be symptoms of or 
correspond with mental illness). See generally Anita Bernstein, Lawyers with Disabilities: 
LHandicapé Cest Nous, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 389 (2008) (noting that while lawyers are 
afforded ADA protections, they are often prejudiced by other lawyers making claims in 
the interest of client safety); Donald B. Hilliker, The Impaired Lawyer: Implications 
Under the Rules of Professional Conduct, 2004 PROF. LAW. 49 (outlining the ethical 
implications and duties of impaired lawyers and those aware of their impairment). 
 266. See Timmons, supra note 260, at 208 (describing grandiosity and loud, rapid, and 
difficult to interrupt speech as symptoms of bipolar disorder); Stacey A. Tovino, 
Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 469, 51314 
(2009) (referencing National Institute of Mental Health defining bipolar mania as a mental 
disorder that causes shifts in a persons mood, energy, ability to function, and irritability). 
 267. Cf. Frederick Cassidy et al., A Factor Analysis of the Signs and Symptoms of 
Mania, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 27, 27 (1998) (noting the four defining aspects of 
mania are euphoric mood, psychomotor pressure, grandiosity, and irritable aggression). 
 268. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 62306238 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010) 
(establishing the Attorney Diversion and Assistance Program to help rehabilitate 
impaired attorneys suffering from addiction or mental illness); RULES REGULATING THE 
FLA. BAR R. 2-9.11 (2010) (creating a fund and offering assistance for attorneys suffering 
from chemical dependency or psychological impairments); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, App. 1-A, 
Rule 5.1(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (allowing attorneys to enter diversion programs, 
including psychological counseling, in lieu of formal proceedings for less serious offenses); 
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.03 (allowing lawyers to report another 
lawyer to a peer assistance program when mental illness is the cause of misconduct); 
RULES GOVERNING THE UTAH STATE BAR R.14-533 (2010) (offering a diversion program for 
lawyers consisting of penalties ranging from paying restitution to undergoing 
psychological and behavioral counseling); WASH. RULES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF LAWYER 
CONDUCT, ELC 6.1, 6.2, 8.2 (effective Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/ 
court_rules/?fa=court_rules.rulesPDF&groupName=ga&setName=ELC&pdf=1 (stating 
that diversion programs for attorney misconduct can include psychological and behavior 
counseling, but failing to list mental illness as a basis for utilizing the diversion 
program); UTAH SUPREME COURT STANDING ORDER NO. 7 (effective Apr. 1, 2008) (creating 
a professionalism counseling referral program). There are many alcohol and drug 
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that those who cannot control their rude behavior should be 
treated differently from those who can, what should a judge in a 
jurisdiction with a courtesy code, but no mental health referral 
system, do when confronted with unprofessional behavior that 
might be attributable to mental illness?269 
While the behavior of mentally ill attorneys may be more 
likely to disrupt the fair administration of justicebecause of 
the absence of inhibitions and the ineffectiveness of ordinary 
disincentivestheir behavior is also more likely to be 
involuntary or uncontrollable from a psychological point of 
view.270 Consequently, situations involving lawyers who commit 
repeated acts of incivility because of some degree of mental 
illness not only pose a real dilemma for the bench and bar, but 
also put advocates of courtesy codes in a bind. Medical 
professionals frequently disagree about whether an individual is 
suffering from mental illness, and, in any event, elsewhere in 
the law and society, there is no consensus about the extent to 
which a mentally ill person should be held accountable for 
his/her actions.271 Is it reasonable to expect judges, who often 
must make quick decisions during hearings or trials, to 
distinguish between run-of-the-mill rudeness and manifestations 
                                                     
diversion programs for attorneys. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 03-431 (2003) (indicating that information on diversion 
programs is available through the ABA Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs 
website); Diana M. Ellis, A Decade of Diversion: Empirical Evidence That Alternative 
Discipline Is Working for Arizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY L.J. 1221 (2003) (providing a 
statistical study of the success of Arizonas diversion program). An additional issue is 
whether a lawyers reporting requirement should be affected by knowledge that the 
offending lawyers misconduct was caused by mental illness. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL 
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 03-431 
(2003) (discussing a lawyers duty to report rule violations by another lawyer who may 
suffer from disability or impairment); Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Partners as Their 
Brothers Keepers, 96 KY. L.J. 231, 234 (2008) (noting instances where law firm partners 
choose not to turn in attorneys they know are impaired); Robert Dowers, Comment, 
Duties Invoked Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct by a Mentally Impaired 
Lawyer, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 681, 684 (2006) (commenting on the difficulty lawyers 
have in knowing whether they are impaired such that they are materially unable to 
represent their clients diligently). 
 269. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 03-431, at 3 
(2003) (opining that despite their lack of expertise, lawyers may not be willfully blind to 
obvious symptoms of impairment such as memory lapse or inexplicable behavior). 
 270. See Gross & Muñoz, supra note 261, at 15255 (explaining that emotions, an 
important aspect of mental health, are characteristically powerful and uncontrollable). 
 271. See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the 
Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 151316 
(1992) (struggling to find a balance between the accountability and blamelessness of a 
mentally ill individual); Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and 
Significance of Mental Illness, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 534, 59899 (1995) (The law 
has rejected an irresistible impulse test for legal insanity because of concern with the 
difficulty of differentiating between irresistible and merely unresisted impulses.). 
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of mental illness and act upon those distinctions in enforcing 
courtesy codes?272 
Given the foregoing difficulties, the failure of the 
professionalism paradigm to adopt a more psychologically savvy 
strategy for addressing attorney rudeness may seem 
understandable. In reality, however, those complexities auger 
against having courtesy rules at all, rather than in the direction 
of selectively disregarding psychological insights and pretending 
that all acts of incivility have their origins in character defects or 
willful failures to live up to the officer of the court ideal. At a 
minimum, if jurisdictions persist in adopting and enforcing 
courtesy codes, consideration of the emotional and psychological 
dimensions of impulsive uncivil acts probably can assist a judge 
or the Bar in deciding how to react, even if only by suggesting 
how to make rational distinctions in situations like those posed 
in the Sparky hypotheticals. Even in a case such as Fiegers, 
where mental illness is not an issue, an expanded awareness of 
the relevance of the state of mind behind incivility might have 
counseled the Michigan Bar to refrain from imposing discipline 
because his outburst was an understandable angry response and 
was likely perceived as such by the majority of those who heard 
his comments. 
B. Interpersonal 
A consideration of the intrapersonal aspects of attorney 
misbehavior leads one to an examination of the sphere within 
which civility norms predominantly operateinterpersonal 
relationships. One of the most notable things about the 
professionalism approach to civility is that it presupposes that 
disputes about rude behavior are straightforward matters about 
which consensus exists.273 The drafters of courtesy rules use 
words such as discourteous, disrespectful, and undignified 
                                                     
 272. For a discussion on making quick judgments in general, see MALCOLM 
GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING passim (2005), 
demonstrating that thin slicing and other forms of quick judgments about people 
and situations are often incorrect. Other concerns about judges include their use of 
power through accusations of mental illness. See George J. Alexander, International 
Human Rights Protection Against Psychiatric Political Abuses, 37 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 387, 392 (1997) (noting that it is important to recognize . . . the unique role of 
psychiatry in discrediting opinion and dehumanizing those with whom one disagrees 
and warning that this concern should not be limited to totalitarian 
regimes[,]. . . [but may in fact] be more dangerous in countries in which individual 
rights are generally protected). 
 273. See Amy. R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and 
Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 68788 (1994) (noting the exclusionary nature 
upon which civility codes are based, and the resulting lack of legitimate consensus). 
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without further definition, confident in their convictions that the 
command of the rules is clear; lawyers and judges discern their 
meaning in a uniform way; and judges will enforce these 
prohibitions fairly even if there is a lot of play in the language.274 
From a nonlegal perspective, every one of those assumptions is 
unfounded and probably wrong.275 
Nothing about civility is simple or self-evidently true. It is a 
sprawling, multi-faceted concept that has been the subject of 
diverse commentary and analysis that runs the gamut from primers 
on etiquette by Emily Post276 to theories about the nature of a just 
society by John Rawls.277 A common thread that runs throughout 
civility studies by linguists, social psychologists, anthropologists, 
sociologists, historians, political theorists, and philosophers is that 
the notion of what constitutes civil behavior is contingent and 
relative.278 Not only do definitions of civility vary dramatically 
across history and cultures, but they are also contingent within 
societies and depend on politics, age, religion, and class,279 a concept 
some refer to as the relativity of politeness.280 
Our consensus on what constitutes proper behavior, 
according to historians, evolves as society changes.281 
Commentators have described an increasingly high tolerance for 
informality and vulgarity in contemporary American society.282 To 
many, it seems that traditional restrictions and sanctions for 
rude behavior have all but disappeared.283 Vulgar language and 
curse words have become pervasive in popular culture, and this 
                                                     
 274. See id. at 687 (examining how civility codes micromanage lawyers with broad 
rules that do not allow for flexibility). 
 275. See id. (asserting that ambiguous words mean different things to different 
people, such that they can be interpreted multiple ways). 
 276. See generally PEGGY POST, EMILY POSTS ETIQUETTE (17th ed. 2004) 
(pronouncing proper behavior in a wide variety of circumstances). 
 277. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 11718 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (The idea 
of public reason brings out . . . the great values achieved by a society that realizes in its 
public life . . . a spirit of compromise and the will to honor the duty of public civility.). 
 278. See, e.g., CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 68 (Civility in one context may be 
barbarism in another; whats superficially polite can be covertly rude, and vice versa.). 
 279. DAVETIAN, supra note 6, at 56. 
 280. See RICHARD J. WATTS, POLITENESS passim (2003) (exploring the historical and 
linguistic characteristics of politeness); Anthony Synnott, Endorsement to BENET DAVETIAN, 
CIVILITY: A CULTURAL HISTORY, at back flap (2009) (endorsing Davetians book by 
explaining that it covers topics ranging from toilet hygiene to the relativity of politeness). 
 281. ANNA BRYSON, FROM COURTESY TO CIVILITY passim (1998). 
 282. See JAY, supra note 7, at 223, 22526 (arguing that the increase of cursing in 
films is indicative of societys growing tolerance for vulgarity). 
 283. CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 4652 (A nation of transient strangers [such as the 
United States] is a nation without a real system of social bonds, and any civility thus 
shallowly planted is bound to be fragile.). 
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acceptance is reflected in films, where their use has increased 
steadily.284 
The gap between the legal professions official aversion to 
vulgarity and informality and the contrary attitude of society in 
general is widening.285 The classic professionalism paradigm seems 
to be clinging to the sensibilities of an earlier era, even when other 
facets of the practice of law may be adjusting. For example, 
litigants, witnesses, and observers wear much more casual 
clothing to court than would have been common thirty years ago, 
but reports of judges making an issue of the informality are rare.286 
The majority in Fiegers case was shocked that he compared the 
judges to Nazis, apparently unaware that it is not at all unusual 
for this epithet to be used to condemn the perceived heavy-handed 
use of power.287 The dissent in Fiegers case chastised the majority 
for being out of touch with the public, who would likely have 
viewed his vulgar remarks, including declaring war on the 
judges and suggesting that they be sodomized, as satire, 
hyperbole, and colorfully expressed commentary.288 
Every lawyer is trained to argue that generalized statutory 
language is susceptible to differing interpretations.289 Yet, in 
drafting courtesy and civility rules, the Bar has taken the 
position that the law that governs lawyers is fundamentally 
different from most other law.290 Nonspecific terms like 
courtesy, according to the Bar, provide sufficient notice because 
                                                     
 284. See JAY, supra note 6, at 225 (finding a significant increase in the use of curse 
words in film from before 1960 until the 1980s). The law, however, still views a number of 
the words that are commonly used as legitimately subject to repression in some 
circumstances. See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 180607 (2009) 
(detailing the evolving enforcement of statutory restrictions placed on indecent 
broadcasts). 
 285. In F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., Justice Stevens observed that: 
It is ironic, to say the least, that while the FCC patrols the airwaves for words 
that have a tenuous relationship with sex or excrement, commercials broadcast 
during prime-time hours frequently ask viewers whether they too are battling 
erectile dysfunction or are having trouble going to the bathroom. 
Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1827 & n.4, 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with 
the majoritys holding that the FCC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in changing 
its policy from a per se nonactionable rule for nonrepetitive use of expletives to a 
context-based approach). 
 286. See KATHY LASTER, LAW AS CULTURE 310 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the 
ritualistic aspect of clothing in the courtroom). 
 287. Grievance Admr v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 142 (Mich. 2006). 
 288. Id. at 176 n.15 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); id. at 197 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 289. See LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION xxvii (2d ed. 2009) (noting the importance of statutory interpretation as 
statutes gradually replace common law). 
 290. See DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 23133 (2008) (describing 
how legal ethics has become increasingly regulated over time). 
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these provisions reference normative content that is already 
known to lawyers.291 Civility studies make clear that the opposite 
is true: unwritten norms are, in reality, unfixed and perceived 
differently by lawyers in a demographically diverse profession 
and a pluralistic society.292 Outside of homogenous groups, no 
consensus exists about appropriate language except at a level of 
generality that is not helpful (e.g., avoid using vulgar or indecent 
language in court) or at the outermost boundaries of behavior 
where other law is implicated (e.g., do not threaten opposing 
counsel with physical violence).293 
Legislative efforts to overcome this lack of notice by 
providing more specific definitions in rules seem doomed to fail. 
Words such as incivility,294 decorum,295 courtesy,296 and 
offensive,297 are invariably defined by using other equally 
vague words. Given the creativity, persistence, and 
argumentativeness of lawyers, drafting courtesy codes that 
prohibit enumerated acts and forbid specified words would be, 
not just an exercise in futility, but an absurdity.298 Case law is 
similarly unlikely to provide any particularized guidance. 
Would a case holding that a lawyer violated a courtesy rule by 
calling an opponents witness a nut case outside a courtroom299 
notify a lawyer who is about to yell at opposing counsel in a 
                                                     
 291. Mashburn, supra note 273, at 687. 
 292. Id. 
 293. For example, even the expression of anger, which is a neurological response, is 
learned in a familial and cultural context. JAY, supra note 7, at 59. 
 294. Ill-bred, uncivil, or uncourteous behaviour towards others; want of civility or 
politeness; discourtesy, rudeness. 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 797 (2d ed. 1989). 
 295. That which is proper, suitable, seemly, befitting, becoming; fitness, propriety, 
congruity. 4 id. at 348. 
 296. Courteous behaviour; courtly elegance and politeness of manners; graceful 
politeness or considerateness in intercourse with others. 3 id. at 1061. 
 297. Offense can be defined as [t]he action of attacking or assailing; attack, 
assault and as [a] breach of law, duty, propriety, or etiquette; a transgression, sin, 
wrong, misdemeanour, or misdeed; a fault. 5 id. at 724. Offend can be defined as [t]o 
sin against; to wrong (a person); to violate or transgress (a law, etc.) or [t]o hurt or 
wound the feelings or susceptibilities of; to be displeasing or disagreeable to; to vex, 
annoy, displease, anger. Id. at 725. Offensive is defined as [p]ertaining or tending to 
offence or attack; attacking; aggressive; adapted or used for purposes of attack; 
characterized by attacking or causing offence. Id. at 72526. 
 298. For example, could a court enforce a rule that said a lawyer could not smirk in 
court? Smirk is defined: To smile in an affected, self-satisfied, or silly manner; to 
simper. 9 id. at 792. See Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, No. 3:06-96, 2007 WL 1276909, at 
*3 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2007) (involving a lawyer who called opposing counsel a ferret hit 
with an electric cattle prod and Eddie Haskell). 
 299. See Attorney Grievance Commn of Md. v. Link, 844 A.2d 1197, 1203 & n.8 (Md. 
2004); see also Lieberman v. Fieger, 338 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining how a 
psychiatrist sued Fieger for defamation after he called the psychiatrist, who had testified 
as an expert witness, nuts and Looney Tunes). 
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courthouse corridor, Read the case, Moron[!]300 that he would 
be in danger of sanctions? 
Attempting to determine forbidden words and deeds out of 
context is fruitless for a more fundamental reason. Experts tell 
us that languages are organic and growing; new words and 
expressions constantly come into existence, while others wither 
and die.301 Popular usage transforms formerly forbidden words 
into acceptable ones.302 For example, the curse words jackass,303 
hell, and damn are probably now so commonly used that they 
are no longer considered by most to be vulgar.304 Yet, it remains 
unclear whether a Michigan judge could sanction a lawyer who 
complained that the courts ruling against her client was a 
miscarriage of justice and a damn shame. 
Both offensiveness and politeness must be assessed 
contextually. Words and phrases may be offensive in one context 
but not in another.305 Linguists explain that being offended by a 
word is not caused by a quality of the word per se, but rather is a 
personal reaction to stimuli, which include the offending event 
and the offender.306 The words a person finds offensive tell us 
something about personality, rather than semantics.307 
Politeness is similarly relative and relational.308 Linguistic 
politeness is defined as establishing an interactional 
relationship in which both the content of the speech and the 
linguistic expression make the speech appropriate.309 According 
to one linguist, what may be frowned upon as inconsiderate or 
even rude in one culture may have relation-consolidating effects 
                                                     
 300. See State v. Torres, 632 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2001). 
 301. See TIMOTHY B. JAY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 451 (2003) (Human 
language evolves through individuals who live in cultures.); Mark Pagel, Quentin D. 
Atkinson & Andrew Meade, Frequency of Word-Use Predicts Rates of Lexical Evolution 
Throughout Indo-European History, 449 NATURE 717, 717 (2007) (using a comparative 
database to propose that the most frequently used words tend to remain unaltered while 
rarer words change or disappear). 
 302. JAY, supra note 7, at 197. 
 303. Cf. Fieger v. Mich. Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955, 976 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, 
J., dissenting) (observing that usage of the term jackass is likely impermissible despite 
the fact that the word is a non-vulgar name for a donkey). 
 304. JAY, supra note 7, at 197. 
 305. JAY, supra note 6, at 13. 
 306. Id. at 161. 
 307. Id. 
 308. See WATTS, supra note 280, at 253 ([T]here are endless daily reminders of the 
social/cultural relativity of politeness and of norms of acceptable interaction.); see also 
GLADWELL, supra note 272, 5455 (finding through experimentation that people are 
primed to be rude or respectful by circumstances). 
 309. LINGUISTIC POLITENESS ACROSS BOUNDARIES xii (Arin Bayraktaroglu & Maria 
Sifianou eds., 2001). 
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in other parts of the world.310 For example, some linguists 
believe Greek is effectively spoken only with the use of facial 
expressions, gestures, and intonations.311 They contend that, for 
these reasons, Greeks may appear rude and abrupt to the 
English, while the English, who use far fewer gestures, seem to 
Greeks to be insincere, distant, and hypocritically subservient 
(because of their profuse use of phrases like thank you).312 
Conceptions of incivility vary not only among cultures, but also 
within them depending on the relative power of the participants.313 
This variability is particularly important to consider in situations 
involving attorney behavior, not only because of the obvious power 
differential among judges, the Bar, and lawyers, but also because of 
resource disparities among lawyers clients. It is probably 
reasonable to assume that a client with more money has more 
power than a client with significantly fewer resources. A closer 
examination of the relationship among language, anger, and power 
reveals how multifaceted and nuanced even simple civility 
directives, such as do not use curse words, can be. 
Impolite utterances come in a variety of forms, including: 
cursing, profanity, blasphemy, taboos, obscenity, vulgarity, 
slang, epithets, insults, slurs, and scatology, among others.314 
Even swearing, it seems, is a relational activity.315 According to 
Timothy Jay, speakers carry around in their heads an 
etiquette for swearing,316 and consequently, cursing is never 
chaotic, meaningless, or random behavior[it] is . . . purposeful 
and rule-governed,317 and occasionally, strategic.318 Social 
psychologists use the term aversive behavior to describe the 
mean, nasty, annoying things people do to one another.319 They 
                                                     
 310. Id. at 4. 
 311. Id. at 31. 
 312. See id. at 2931 (observing the English use a more level delivery compared to 
characteristically extroverted Greek speakers). 
 313. See JAY, supra note 301, at 451 (listing dominance relationships along with 
personal space and status as concepts that affect social contexts); cf. CALDWELL, supra 
note 2, at 16869 (recognizing that relations between different races have been poisoned 
by the massed forces of an abusive political, social, and economic history, whose shadows 
never seem to dissipate). 
 314. JAY, supra note 7, at 9. 
 315. See, e.g., JAY, supra note 6, at 8384, 96. ([T]he expression of anger with 
dirty words may be highly dependent on the context of the episode, the relationship 
between the speakers, the prosodic features of the speech and other sociolinguistic 
factors.). 
 316. Id. at 109. 
 317. JAY, supra note 7, at 22. 
 318. Id. at 57. 
 319. See, e.g., ROBIN M. KOWALSKI, COMPLAINING, TEASING, AND OTHER ANNOYING 
BEHAVIORS, at flyleaf (2003); Robin M. Kowalski, Aversive Interpersonal Behaviors: On 
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contend that aversive behaviors can perform an interpersonal 
function, such as when name-calling is used to manipulate 
another person.320 
The primary emotional use for cursing is the expression of 
anger.321 Anger, according to Jay, is often a response to an 
obstacle and cursing is, in essence, verbal aggression.322 
Moreover, the expression of spoken anger is coded to the nature 
of the provocation, with intentional acts provoking more anger.323 
Anger assesses blame and passes a value judgment on the one 
who provokes it.324 Although anger-motivated cursing sometimes 
has as its goal making the target feel offended,325 it is nonetheless 
socially valuable. Cursing replaces physical aggression.326 
Furthermore, expressing anger with words may also perform a 
corrective, equalizing function in hostile interactions where there 
is a power differential among the participants.327 
The social context within which impolite interactions occur 
is suffused with the participants awareness of nonverbal factors 
affecting the appropriateness of communication, such as the 
social status of the parties and their relative power, which 
suggest what an individual should and should not do.328 Speakers 
adapt their verbal and nonverbal communication in a manner 
that is responsive to their listeners power and those adaptations 
reflect perceptions about the parties standing in relationship to 
each other.329 When power and status are unequal, 
communication becomes asymmetrical.330 Power differentials 
allow us to talk up or down to a listener.331 People with power 
have license to tell jokes, make fun of subordinates, and use 
curse words . . . . because they suffer no social consequences for 
                                                     
Being Annoying, Thoughtless, and Mean, in BEHAVING BADLY: AVERSIVE BEHAVIORS IN 
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 3, 34 (Robin M. Kowalski ed., 2001). 
 320. JAY, supra note 301, at 41819; Kowalski, supra note 319, at 45. 
 321. JAY, supra note 7, at 55. 
 322. JAY, supra note 6, at 10102. 
 323. Id. at 100. 
 324. Id. at 108. 
 325. JAY, supra note 7, at 57. 
 326. JAY, supra note 6, at 97. 
 327. See id. (The function of expressing anger with words and not physical acts of 
violence is to perform a corrective operation.). 
 328. See JAY, supra note 301, at 451 (Along with the rules of conversational 
patterning, every social context activates awareness about personal space, status, and 
dominance relationships.). 
 329. Yasemin Bayyurt & Arin Bayraktaro lu, The Use of Pronouns and Terms of 
Address in Turkish Service Encounters, in LINGUISTIC POLITENESS ACROSS BOUNDARIES, 
supra note 309, passim. 
 330. JAY, supra note 7, at 157. 
 331. Id. at 158. 
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doing it.332 Ordinarily, those with less power feel a need to be 
more polite to those who have more power.333 
Linguistic politeness, however, can also be used in a passive 
aggressive manner by persons with lower status to equalize 
power differentials.334 They may use a strategy of negative 
politeness (e.g., being offensive, but apologizing for it) or one of 
positive politeness (e.g., using effusive compliments that suggest 
familiarity) to narrow the power gap between them.335 
Alternatively, a member of the lower classes may reduce class 
and power disparities more directly through verbal aggression.336 
Verbal aggression, through curses and insults, is a means of 
reducing class and power differences because it expresses 
disregard for the elevated status of the more powerful party and 
uses words to diminish his/her status.337 A put down is used 
literally to lower the social class of another.338 
While cursing may serve psychologically to diminish the 
power of ones opponent, the converse is rarely truevulgar 
language does not raise the speakers social status outside the 
realm of the parties interaction.339 This is true because of the 
construction put upon this type of language and behavior beyond 
the sphere of interpersonal interactions and in a broader societal 
context. Inappropriate cursing has historically been a marker of 
low social status.340 Similarly, the expression of anger in any form 
has been considered primitive, uncultured and ill-mannered, 
because being able to inhibit and control ones anger was both a 
prerequisite for, and a marker of, membership in the upper 
classes.341 Sigmund Freud referred to the inappropriate 
                                                     
 332. Id. at 15758. 
 333. See Seran Dogancay-Aktuna & Sibel Kamisli, Linguistics of Power and 
Politeness in Turkish, in LINGUISTIC POLITENESS ACROSS BOUNDARIES, supra note 309, at 
75, 84 (reporting the results of a study showing how less powerful people perceive a need 
for greater politeness around higher status individuals). 
 334. See JAY, supra note 7, at 15859, 163 (noting Sigmund Freuds belief that 
insults allowed lower class members to lessen class disparities). 
 335. Dogancay-Aktuna & Kamisli, supra note 333, at 7778; see Bayyurt  
& Bayraktaroglu, supra note 329, at 21415 (illustrating how positive and negative 
politeness can occur even in those situations that do not call for politeness). 
 336. See JAY, supra note 7, at 9, 57 (suggesting that cursing includes verbal 
aggression, which can be used strategically to harm or bully others, or obtain some 
reward, such as the admiration of peers). 
 337. See JAY, supra note 7, at 15759 (contending that a speaker can curse to change 
the formality of the conversation and reduce class differences). 
 338. Id. at 159. 
 339. See id. at 15859 (discussing how offending higher-status individuals can bring 
social cost, and that inappropriate cursing is an indication of lower social status). 
 340. Id. at 158. 
 341. JAY, supra note 6, at 10102. 
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expression of emotions in the public sphere as unsuitable 
affect.342 So-called affect control required the projection of a false 
front and the practice of moderated hypocrisy.343 Among the 
upper and rising classes, affect control became the prevailing 
rule governing day-to-day encounters because it was assumed 
that if one could conceal ones feelings, one could control them, 
(i.e., behave in a civilized manner).344 Civility thus defined 
required the bifurcation of private affect from public demeanor, 
because too much of any intense emotion was viewed as a threat 
to the superficial, fragile solidarity of civility.345 
C. Societal 
Taking a closer look at the relationship among cursing, 
anger, and power leads inevitably to consideration of civility 
from a more all-encompassing societal perspective. Such an 
examination is fruitful because manners, according to those who 
study them, are not merely empty formalities . . . [but] are 
inextricably tied to larger political, social, and cultural contexts 
and . . . their ramifications extend deep into human relations 
and the individual personality.346 Not only do these rituals of 
everyday behavior give structure to our interactions, but they 
also serve to bind a group of individuals together in a society.347 
On the surface, etiquette is a code of conduct that lends 
predictability to interactions.348 On a deeper level, etiquette may 
also be understood as a system that allows the powerful to 
control [an] ill-mannered underclass by denying them access 
to . . . social power.349 Those who study manners, point out that 
sanctions for being ill-mannered are often subtle and 
invisible.350 While this is probably generally true in the legal 
profession as well, courtesy codes operate differently. They force 
the Bar and judiciary to make their decisions to punish 
                                                     
 342. See JOHN MURRAY CUDDIHY, THE ORDEAL OF CIVILITY 19 (1974) (discussing 
Freuds study of the unconscious). 
 343. John A. Hall, In Search of Civil Society, in CIVIL SOCIETY 1, 26 (John A. Hall ed., 
1995). 
 344. 2 NORBERT ELIAS, POWER & CIVILITY 31112 (Edmund Jephcott trans., 1982); 
see JOHN F. KASSON, RUDENESS & CIVILITY 14849 (1990) (asserting the importance 
traditional etiquette manuals placed on hiding and, through practice, containing ones 
emotions). 
 345. CUDDIHY, supra note 342, at 1314. 
 346. KASSON, supra note 344, at 3. 
 347. Id. at 4; see CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 2930 (arguing that a mannerly 
customs real function is to bond [a] group together, however that group is defined). 
 348. JAY, supra note 7, at 206. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. at 20607. 
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impoliteness explicit and are, therefore, interesting laboratories 
for studying civility as applied. The discussion that follows 
identifies themes common to broader historical and political 
studies of civility. 
Whether impolite behavior is becoming more pervasive or 
not, it is clear that we have been worrying about it for a long 
time.351 Echoing popular concerns, the Michigan Supreme Court 
majority in Grievance Administrator v. Fieger expressed 
apprehension that the legal profession was on a runaway train 
of incivility.352 Historians caution that, beginning almost a 
century ago, jeremiads against rudeness have been a recurrent 
feature of societal commentary.353 Other commentators believe 
that incivility has increased, but argue that this occurs before a 
society renews its commitment to politeness and mutual 
respect.354 A historical theory of incivility posits that the societal 
consensus may actually be strongest when it appears 
broken.355 In other words, societal rebellion against good 
manners may herald an increased tendency to take morals 
[more] seriously.356 
Norbert Elias is the source of the historical analysis that 
supports this thesis and its important corollaryetiquette 
becomes more elaborate when a society views it as decaying.357 
Elias explained that, in English history, as societal functions 
proliferated and became more differentiated under the pressure 
of competition, individuals were required to interact with and 
depend upon more and more people.358 They were compelled at 
both a conscious and an unconscious level to regulate their 
conduct.359 As the state came to monopolize force, individuals 
were protected by the government from physical harm by others, 
but were required, in turn, to suppress their own impulses 
                                                     
 351. See, e.g., CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 1012 (listing works on civility dating back 
to the 1800s, which all note the perceived coarsening of American manners); KASSON, 
supra note 344, at 3 (acknowledging the belief that manners have been in a state of 
decline for a very long time). 
 352. See Grievance Admr v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 13233 (Mich. 2006) ([R]ules of 
the sort at issue here . . . are designed to maintain public respect for a rule of law that is 
dependent on such public respect.). 
 353. CALDWELL, supra note 2, passim; KASSON, supra note 344, passim. 
 354. DAVETIAN, supra note 6, at 497, 503, 523 (Periods of reformation and 
revolution are . . . corrective measures designed to bring a culture back into a sort of 
self-alignment.). 
 355. CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 241. 
 356. Id. (emphasis added). 
 357. Id. 
 358. ELIAS, supra note 344, at 232. 
 359. Id. at 23233. 
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towards physical violence.360 As the societal web of interactions 
broadened, the well-being of individuals who could not moderate 
their spontaneous emotions was more often imperiled.361 Manners 
played an important role in that they represented societys 
judgment about the form moderated impulses were to take.362 
According to historians, the proliferation of rules of etiquette 
was part of the emergence of the English middle class.363 The 
rising classes identified with the upper classes and sought to 
adopt their manners (including affect control) and abandon lower 
class gestures . . . of subordination.364 They acknowledged the 
upper class codes as binding on them, but could not abide by 
them with the same ease as those born to the upper classes.365 
The upper classes in turn responded with a feverish 
multiplication of class distinctions and more elaborate codes of 
etiquette.366 The middle class, according to Elias, was in a 
predicament.367 By embracing the upper classs strict codes of 
manners as a prestige instrument they sought to distinguish 
themselves from the lower classes.368 Those same codes, however, 
were also instruments of power and oppression that the upper 
classes used against them.369 
Applying this historical perspective to attorney incivility 
would suggest that perceptions of increased attorney rudeness 
may simply be wrongit could be that, despite the fact that the 
legal profession has perceived itself to be in such a crisis for more 
than a century, the reality is that the relative frequency of acts of 
incivility has not increased. Furthermore, according to the 
historical theory, even if the Bars assumption that lawyer 
incivility is at an all time high is factually correct, it may not be 
an entirely negative situation because widespread rudeness may 
be the harbinger of a society-wide recommitment to better 
behavior. On the other hand, the historical theory would also 
suggest that the Bar may be reacting to its perceptions of the 
legal professions collective loss of status and diminishment of its 
                                                     
 360. Id. at 23536. 
 361. Id. at 236.  
 362. Id. 
 363. See id. at 31417 (analyzing the growth of the middle class and its adoption of 
rules of conduct, followed by the upper class). 
 364. Id. at 309, 313. 
 365. Id. at 313. 
 366. CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 3334. 
 367. ELIAS, supra note 344, at 313. 
 368. Id.; see KASSON, supra note 344, at 43 (discussing the use of proper etiquette to 
differentiate oneself). 
 369. ELIAS, supra note 344, at 31213. 
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societal prestige because of encroachments by ill-mannered 
members of the profession. Its reaction appears similar to that of 
the nineteenth-century English upper classesthe enactment of 
increasingly exacting rules governing conduct and personal 
expression.370 Unfortunately, the historical theory would also 
suggest that paradoxically, such rules pursue[ ] a logic 
that . . . [leads] not toward unity but toward fragmentation.371 In 
law, this fragmentation may mean increased status-based 
stratification of the Bar. 
A core component of the historical theory of civility theme is 
the relationship between class and deference. To one historian, 
[c]lass is to the discussion of civility what the ghost of the 
murdered king is to Hamleta ubiquitous exhalation poisoning 
the atmosphere, elusive, intimidating, but impossible to lay to 
rest.372 Elias subsequently decided that class might be too 
narrow a word and concept, and suggested instead that we 
should be thinking in terms of those who are established in 
contrast to those who are outsiders.373 This shift in definition 
was a more accurate description of the dynamic of group 
domination and group submission to which Elias was referring.374 
Historians have explained that the manner in which a 
society categorized appropriate and inappropriate behavior and 
how the resulting social hierarchies operated, tell us something 
important about how that culture defined itself.375 Those 
categories of behavior required deference within the hierarchies 
they created.376 A guiding a priori principle operated behind the 
rules of etiquette: one deferred to ones betters and those at the 
top of the power pyramid deferred to no one.377 The power of 
                                                     
 370. See KASSON, supra note 344, at 14748 (The physical control and self-discipline 
demanded by nineteenth-century etiquette were supported by equally exacting standards 
of emotional control.). 
 371. Id. at 257. 
 372. CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 9. 
 373. See ELIAS, supra note 344, at 25051 (viewing the civilizing process as a vicious 
cycle in which the oppressed outsiders becomes the established oppressor). 
 374. See id. at 251 (The time may well come when the former oppressed 
groups . . . do not become oppressors in turn; but it is not yet in sight.); KASSON, supra 
note 344, at 4 (discussing how manners take the historian squarely into the dialectics of 
social classification). 
 375. KASSON, supra note 344, passim. 
 376. See id. at 4 ([O]ne may see how these categories [of manners] are historically 
constituted, their hierarchies maintained and challenged.); PHILIP SOPER, THE ETHICS OF 
DEFERENCE 158 (2002) (illustrating the need to adjust to and defer to the views of another 
out of respect). 
 377. See, e.g., JAY, supra note 7, at 15859, 163 (noting that someone with power can 
curse without facing social consequences while someone without power may defer to their 
superior). 
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contempt to maintain courtroom decorum, which traces its 
origins to a time when the Kings surrogates presided at trials, is 
an example of the deference principle in operation.378 The Kings 
surrogates commanded the same degree of deference for 
themselves as was owed to the King. To defy a courts powerto 
fail to give deference duewas the equivalent of being 
contemptuous of the sovereigns authority.379 
Note that imbedded within the act of deferring to another is 
suppression of an impulse to act in a less deferential, more 
autonomous, self-serving manner.380 In a pre-Bourgeois, 
deference-based society, a hegemony of force controlled the 
autonomy-preserving and power-seeking impulses of 
individuals.381 The notion of deferring to ones betters, however, 
continued to permeate the European rules of social engagement 
and did not disappear with the rise of the middle classes.382 
The precepts of European class and deference-based social 
customs were imported into the United States, but required 
translation in order to function effectively within a democracy.383 
The issue for Americans was how to build a system of republican 
manners.384 Although European class distinctions would not 
work in America, historians believe that, ironically, economic 
stratification heightened Americans interest in [a] class-based 
etiquette system.385 Classes emerged based on wealth and 
members of the resulting upper classes expected deference from 
members of the lower classes, but this was a distinctly American 
form of deference.386 Social mobility, political equality, and the rule 
of law, even if no more than ideological commitments, required 
public moderation of demands for class-based deference.387 
                                                     
 378. CUDDIHY, supra note 342, at 195. 
 379. Id. 
 380. See SOPER, supra note 376, at 23 (showing that deferring to others necessitates 
sublimation of how one acts under usual circumstances). 
 381. See ELIAS, supra note 344, at 1112 (discussing how monarchies maintained 
power by balancing the interests of the bourgeoisie and nobility to make sure neither 
gained the upper hand). 
 382. See id. at 30712 (discussing the rise of the European working class and how its 
members continued to control their own affects according to the same pattern). 
 383. See CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 3435, 92 (addressing the breakdown of the 
medieval gulf between aristocrat and peasant in America and the difficulty in creating 
etiquette standards when everyone is supposedly equal). 
 384. Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 385. Id. at 3435. 
 386. See id. at 3335 (explicating how wealth delineates the class system in America 
and how members of the lower classes seek to model themselves after the upper class and 
climb the ranks). 
 387. Id. at 5761. 
Do Not Delete  2/21/2011  6:01 PM 
1214 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [47:5 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that a civility system 
premised even in part on the notion that one owes deference to 
another solely because of his/her position in society was 
historically, and continues to be, a problematic organizing 
principle for Americans. As one historian discerned, In 
hierarchical societies, . . . people learned to control themselves 
before their superiors or equals, but indulged their tempers with 
inferiors. In a democracy . . . where all are equal, . . . every man 
must . . . learn[ ] to control his temper.388 
The classic professionalism paradigm seems to be based at 
least in part on a deference-based conception of civility. This is 
understandable to some extent because of the necessity to 
preserve the rule of law by mandating obedience to court orders. 
The government must maintain its monopoly of force. The 
farther removed the incivility is from the courtroom and the 
orders of a court, however, the weaker the justification for 
demanding deference becomes. Furthermore, the rationale is 
clearly at its weakest when advanced to prevent extra-judicial 
insults to the dignity of individual judges. One may view the 
majority in Fiegers case as punishing him for his failure to 
continue to defer to appellate judges, members of the upper 
class of the legal system, beyond the sphere of the tribunals 
state-sanctioned power. Viewed thusly, the Michigan Bars 
position was that Fieger should have curbed his tongue, 
moderated the impulse to strike out verbally in anger, and 
maintained affect control even though his speech was outside 
the courtroom and any threat posed by his rude remarks to the 
functioning of the system was attenuated at best. 
Historians view the question whether good manners, 
class-based distinctions, and status-conscious expectations of 
deference can coexist in a legitimate system of etiquette as one of 
the issues closest to the heart of the civility debate.389 This query is 
premised not only on the relatively noncontroversial assumption 
that a rigid class system is immoral, but also on the more 
problematic contention that manners embody moral norms.390 One 
has only to consider that the cannibalism rituals of the Aztecs 
were controlled by elaborate rules of etiquette to see why the latter 
supposition should be subjected to very close scrutiny indeed.391 
                                                     
 388. KASSON, supra note 344, at 159 (restating the reasoning of scholar Frederick 
Marryat). 
 389. See CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 31 (recognizing that etiquette necessarily 
vanishes when all class distinctions are removed). 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 2930. 
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Emily Post believed that rules of civility codify universal and 
unchanging moral principles.392 Today, as in the past, it is not 
unusual for discussions of manners to become intertwined with 
ethics.393 Immanuel Kant, for example, accepted that etiquette 
was separate from and inferior to morals, but nonetheless 
viewed manners as a means of developing virtue and becoming 
receptive to virtuous principles.394 The modern view is more likely 
that [m]anners are related to morals . . . . [b]ut the link is far 
more deceptive, sinuous, and complicated than is usually 
admitted.395 Another way to pose this question is to ask whether 
civility is a virtue and to consider whether we should distinguish 
the decline of civility from the decline of virtue. 396 
Before addressing the question whether civility is a virtue, 
however, one must first surmount a serious obstacle to any 
attempt to treat civility as a positive norm: perceptions that 
advocating civility is hypocritical. As previously explained, 
historians, like John Keane and Norbert Elias, have 
demonstrated that notions of civility are often thinly disguised 
tools for exclusion and hierarchy.397 Contemporary commentary 
would add that calls for greater civility are often 
unacknowledged appeals to traditional values and have 
consequently become a centerpiece of conservative social 
agendas.398 One commentator suggests that some of the appeals 
for increased civility are, in fact, advancing an implicit defense of 
the status quo and worries that such advocacy can become a 
fetish of the dominant classes [ ]and . . . a weapon of 
domination.399 Others contend that civility advocates conflate 
civility with the more exacting Christian or classical virtues.400 
For critics, the problem is not just that civility codes are 
conservative, conformist, oppressive, and stultifying, but that the 
drafters of these provisions do not see or will not acknowledge 
any defects or weaknesses in the justifications supporting 
                                                     
 392. Id. at 61. 
 393. See id. at 11 (noting manners have a propensity of get[ting] themselves 
hopelessly entangled with ethics). 
 394. Id. at 2223. 
 395. Id. at 241. 
 396. Leroy S. Rouner, Introduction to CIVILITY 1, 68 (Leroy S. Rouner ed., 2000). 
 397. RICHARD BOYD, UNCIVIL SOCIETY 25 (2004). 
 398. Id. at 2526; see CUDDIHY supra note 342, at 189 (raising the issue of whether 
decorum and civility are a social prerequisite to political rights). 
 399. KINGWELL, supra note 1, at 231, 23435 (defining civility as a strategy of 
ideological continuance). 
 400. BOYD, supra note 397, at 29 (describing Stephen Carters work as reinforcing 
the conservative dimensions of civility). 
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them.401 These critics argue that civility is a hypocritical 
figleaf,402 a sham, or a shadow play, that prevents us from 
seeing the power struggles that determine the distribution of 
wealth in a society.403 
Civility is also viewed as hypocritical in another sense. One 
may carry out the rituals of etiquette with great civility, but still 
manage to be insincere, condescending, and insulting.404 As one 
commentator notes: Excessive politeness, as most of us know, 
can actually be impoliteboth intentionally (in irony and 
sarcasm) and unintentionally (as, e.g., when a person I consider a 
friend persists in treating me with elaborate courtesy).405 When 
Immanuel Kant argued that manners help to make us virtuous, 
he was not referring to the cold [form of] politeness based on 
disrespect which is destructive.406  
On a more profound level, defining someone who might be 
engaged in behavior that is very harmful to others or society as 
civil because while doing so they observed the rules of 
etiquette is itself ethically questionable, particularly if one is 
inclined to imbue the notion of civility with any moral content. 
As Hamlet observed, one may smile, and smile, and be a 
villain.407 One commentator, by way of illustration, points to a 
New York businessman he calls [t]he rudest man of the 
twentieth century who was a master of every social grace.408 
Others worry that civility . . . [is] an unconscionable 
willingness to ignore deep-seated moral disagreements in the 
interest of simply getting along peacefully or maintaining 
decorum,409 and point to the awful efficiency of the caste 
system in India, which adheres remarkably to the ideal of the 
civil society.410 
Perhaps because of these overwhelming criticisms, the 
collective theoretical discussion is not much concerned with 
                                                     
 401. ROBERT B. PIPPIN, THE PERSISTENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY 228 (2005); cf. Erik K. 
Johnson, Standards for Standards Sake: Questioning the Standards of Professionalism 
and Civility, UTAH B.J., MayJune 2005, at 10, 12, 14 (criticizing civility standards 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court for having obvious flaws and being unenforceable 
and unnecessary). 
 402. CUDDIHY, supra note 342, at 5. 
 403. Kingwell, supra note 1, at 48. 
 404. BOYD, supra note 397, at 25. 
 405. KINGWELL, supra note 1, at 207. 
 406. Supra note 394 and accompanying text; Carrie Doehring, Civility in the Family, 
in CIVILITY, supra note 396, at 168. 
 407. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5. 
 408. CALDWELL, supra note 2, at 15. 
 409. BOYD, supra note 397, at 25. 
 410. Hall, supra note 343, at 25. 
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identifying the specific content of universal morals or values, 
purportedly embodied by rules of etiquette (however broadly 
defined), but has turned instead to attempting to define a civil 
society in terms of the way its citizens deal with one another. The 
resulting body of political theorythe so-called civil society 
literatureis extensive and substantial and may be collectively 
described here in only general terms.411 
The overarching theme of these works seems to be that the 
fundamental conception of civilization includes the notion of 
civility, and in order to be deemed civilized, a society must treat 
its citizens in a certain manner. Civil interaction is often 
described using the terms of an implicit bargain: citizens agree to 
be law-abiding, and their societies agree to guarantee the rule of 
law.412 John Rawls describes the duty of public civility as a 
cooperative virtue[ ] of political life and an ideal of 
citizenship.413 Rawls contribution was to insist that the 
imperfection in social institutions cannot provide prima facie 
justification for disobedience, and to shift the focus to civility 
[as] the virtue . . . that allows the state to have authority, while 
at the same time allowing us to exercise our faculties of critical 
judgment about state institutions.414 
Cultural and political theorists have put forward a variety of 
definitions of civility, but most echo these notions of reciprocity 
and mutual respect. Civility thus defined is an attitude of caring 
for the welfare of others as well as the welfare of the culture [we] 
share in common;415 respect for the rights, feelings and thoughts 
of others; and a willingness in some matters to subsume 
individual self-interest for the benefit of the community.416 For 
our purposes here, the defense of civility advanced by Robert 
Pippin seems particularly insightful and relevant to the legal 
professions struggle with implementing civility directives. Pippin 
first notes that the ethical status of civility is distinctive in that 
it is more than being polite and different from being morally 
righteous.417 Pippin argues next that civility is of vital 
importance to the collective pursuit of a free life, which is the 
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highest good of a civil society.418 In other words, civility is the 
enactment in daily rituals of our equal status [as] free agents.419 
The final element of Pippins definition of civility is that its 
dictates must be compatib[le] . . . with[ ] an extremely 
competitive, . . . ethnically diverse, rapidly self-transforming, 
consumer culture.420 
In this broader arena, civility is a mediator of the 
relationship among individuals and groups of individuals, and in 
society. A consensus about proper behavior is obviously more 
easily achieved among a homogenous populace.421 A fundamental 
issue for political theorists, however, is the difficulty of reaching 
agreements about proper behavior in a pluralistic society. They 
question whether the notion of being fellow Americans can 
overcome the misunderstandings and often suspicions 
characteristic of a community with so many different national 
traditions, experiences and religions.422 Respect for differences 
requires that codes of behavior valu[e] . . . as much difference as 
is compatible with the bare minimum of consensus necessary for 
settled existence.423 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that an 
individual can use the civil societys laissez faire form of 
tolerance to justify unbridled self-interest. According to this view, 
the civil society is threatened by all forms of excessive 
individualism and fanaticism.424 This conception of civility 
demands that individuals respect each other as moral equals.425 
Within this environment of mutual respect, citizens commit to 
settle disagreements without resorting to force and violence.426  
Boyd defends civility against charges of conservatism and 
argues that the concept should be embraced by both the left and 
the right.427 Properly conceived, civility does not defend the status 
quo, nor does it rationalize injustices.428 It is, however, radically 
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indifferent to the ends individuals choose so long as they pursue 
them in a manner that respects the rights of others.429 Civility is, 
in this sense, a process-oriented normit creates an 
environment where citizens are able to behave justly, but it is not 
justice itself.430 Acknowledging moral pluralism means we are no 
longer in the business . . . of providing a single . . . answer to the 
question What is justice?431 
Putting the foregoing together produces a deference-based or 
historical theory of attorney incivility. It would predict that the 
legal profession will multiply and make more elaborate its rules 
regulating polite behavior as it perceives that societal and 
professional boundaries and distinctions are breaking down. 
These boundaries are those separating the legal profession from 
other occupations, but also include distinctions and stratification 
based on status within the Bar. The theory predicts that the need 
for more explicit rules will increase if conflicts among members of 
the profession are layered upon other types of conflicts, such as 
occur, for example, in societal debates about tort reform.432 
The deference theory would also predict that the rule breaches 
most likely to be penalized will be those involving defiance directed 
towards high status individuals in the system. Attorneys failures 
to control affect, particularly by openly expressing anger, will 
provoke the most scrutiny and punishment. Penalized lawyers will 
disproportionately be outsiders or those with less status in the Bar. 
Even though most outsiders and low status lawyers will accept and 
internalize the new codes of behavior, the imposition and 
enforcement of such rules will bring fragmentation, rather than the 
desired unity, to the legal profession. 
VI. DEMOCRATIC CIVILITY 
The profile that emerged from the empirical study of the 
lawyer most likely to be sanctioned for incivility mirrors the one 
the historical theory would predict. This troubling result 
suggests that courts may be enforcing broadly worded courtesy 
codes and vague professionalism norms using aristocratic notions 
of deference. The selectivity of the enforcement becomes clear 
only when one considers what was not correlated with a sanction. 
Even though much rude, vulgar, and disruptive speech was 
directed at opposing counsel and a significant amount at 
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opposing parties and witnesses, this misconduct was not 
correlated with punishment.433 
Within the Bar, status has historically been determined by 
the wealth of ones clients, with high status lawyers 
representing entities rather than individuals.434 A particularly 
revealing result of the study is that being in one of two 
categories of lawyersprosecutors and those representing 
corporationswas highly negatively correlated with being 
subjected to discipline.435 This is true despite the fact that most of 
the Sixth Amendment cases were excluded from the database 
because their high stakes (requiring overturning a verdict), it 
was presumed, would make courts more reluctant to sanction 
those prosecutors.436 Recall that the database included only those 
cases where judges were addressing conduct they had already 
classified as unprofessional or uncivil.437 This suggests that 
judges are not treating comparable uncivil acts equitably and 
that the inequity is disproportionately associated with the status 
of the lawyers or their clients. 
Advocates of professionalism do not seem to worry much 
about biased enforcement when they call for greater penalties for 
incivility. As a consequence, civility in the practice of law is 
unlikely to become a more democratic ideal as long as the legal 
profession remains its sole author. A more interdisciplinary 
approach would suggest the following modifications to the 
professionalism model. 
First and foremost, judges and the Bar should remain 
cognizant of the breadth of the power they have over attorneys. 
They have control over virtually every aspect of the disciplinary 
process. In most jurisdictions, they are the legislators, 
regulators, adjudicators, and appellate reviewers of attorney 
misbehavior.438 Given this, disciplinary authorities should 
acknowledge that requiring lawyers to use subjectively defined 
deferential speech in addressing members of one branch of a 
democratic government and demanding that lawyers 
representing their clients interests refrain from criticizing 
judges to protect the judges personal reputations and integrity, 
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are inherently political acts. Civility is not to be understood as a 
set of gag rules, . . . [and we cannot allow] feeling[s] of offense to 
keep the demands [for justice] off the public agenda.439 Lawyers 
should be mindful that in the hands of government, decorum too 
easily becomes repression.440 
Second, civility requires reciprocity. In an ideal version of 
the civil society, lawyers would generally curb their tongues, 
control their fanatical energies,441 and comply with the 
dictates of an often imperfect legal system. One commentator 
captures this concept of reciprocity as two constraints: [O]n 
the one hand, a willingness not to say all the true, or morally 
excellent, things one could say; and, on the other hand, an 
interpretive sensitivity to the legitimacy of claims made by 
others.442 
Third, states should avoid adopting civility codes and refrain 
from enforcing existing professionalism provisions through 
sanctions. In the words of one commentator: [B]eware the 
moralists of manners, the self-appointed defenders of 
civility . . . . [V]alues are always somebodys values.443 As 
explained above, drafting lists of specific prohibited words and 
behavior is not practical, and moreover, with greater specificity, 
consensus is likely to break down. Existing codes use words like 
civility, disrespect, and discourteous,444 which experience 
suggests cannot be given a sufficiently narrow meaning in a 
pluralistic society. For these reasons and more, cases applying 
vaguely-worded courtesy rules are unlikely to give lawyers any 
actual advance warning that their acts or words may subject 
them to discipline. 
An awareness of the psychological motivations for and the 
complex nature of social interactions are required in order to 
administer courtesy codes fairly. The intent of the offender 
matters and perceptions of rudeness and disrespect are very 
subjective and contingent. However, assessing the mental 
state of lawyers at the time they misbehave is prohibitively 
difficult and worrisome. A psychological approach may produce 
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an unpopular, de facto presumption against sanctioning 
attorneys for their rude outbursts, but it also avoids 
unnecessary intrusions into First Amendment rights and 
allays concerns about the due process implications of judges 
sitting in judgment of lawyers who are accused of insulting 
them.445 
Restraint should be the default position of the Bar, judges, 
and the states for another reason. Incivility is, as one 
commentator notes, [a] form[ ] of behavior which may fray the 
fabric of society but . . . [is] not illegal or immoral.446 The results 
of the empirical study showed that very few cases involved 
physical aggression, violence, or threats of violence.447 This may 
be the result of lawyers using angry and vulgar speech to channel 
impulses towards physical violence and replace them with lesser 
transgressionsa desirable outcome.448 A perspective informed 
by insights from other disciplines counsels against overreaction 
to the manifestations of emotion, the use of vulgar language, and 
impolite acts. A sense of being offended or affronted, standing 
alone, should not be a sufficient predicate for a punitive response. 
A regulatory attempt by the Florida Bar is instructive in this 
regard. In 2006, Floridas Commission on Professionalism 
decided that it had to do something about attorney incivility 
and other lapses in professionalism and, therefore, proposed that 
the Florida Supreme Court adopt a new rule of professional 
conduct.449 The rule would have allowed judges to fine lawyers 
between $100 and $500 for instances of incivility. The Florida 
Bars experience with this proposed rule is a perfect illustration 
of the problems with using the professionalism paradigm as a 
template for legislating civility. Despite years of near universal 
support for the Florida Bars professionalism agendawhich 
includes a specific continuing legal education (CLE) requirement 
in professionalismFlorida lawyers balked. They objected to 
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judges being able to condemn their speech or behavior by 
exercising an informal, discretionary power. Professionalism 
advocates in Florida were so zealous in their efforts to give 
judges the unfettered power to punish rude lawyers that they 
made no provisions in the proposed rule for a right of appeal or 
entitlement to any process prior to the imposition of monetary 
sanctions. The rule drafters believed their omissions were 
justified by observations that a remedy less harsh than a 
grievance, and unencumbered by the procedures necessary for a 
contempt citation, was needed.450 This dangerous attitude reasons 
backwards from an end it presupposes to justify the means of 
dispensing with basic due process. 
Fourth, as previously demonstrated, judges and the Bar 
have extensive and varied powers to address the conduct of 
attorneys.451 No more or different laws are necessary to manage 
the judicial system and preserve the rule of law.452 Gaps in 
disciplinary powers exist because regulators have been 
restrained by concerns about reaching too far.453 The reason why 
the majority in Fieger found itself stretching the meanings of a 
pending case and towards the tribunal is because, as the 
empirical study showed, the rules of professional conduct are 
rarely employed to punish speech so far removed from the 
courtroom or active litigation.454 
Adoption of a civil society perspective, i.e., one that 
appreciates social diversity and accommodates ideological 
differences, would push the legal profession in the direction of 
avoiding the enforcement of any particular vision of what 
constitutes courteous and respectful conduct.455 This view favors a 
functional approach that focuses on identifying the existence of a 
threat to the fair administration of justice, rather than on 
classifying an attorneys conduct as in or out of the bounds of 
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decorum. In the ordinary course of events, sanctions should be 
limited to courtroom misbehavior where the threat of disruption 
can be assessed directly and immediately. While this approach 
might seem to forgive too much attorney misconduct outside the 
context of impending or pending litigation, it offsets this 
generosity by demanding reciprocity: judges should take more 
protective action in the courtroom. The results of the empirical 
study suggest that judges may not be aggressive enough in their 
efforts to protect others from the effects of attorney incivility.456 
Consequently, judges should worry less about their own sense of 
being offended and worry more about behavior directed towards 
opposing counsel, clients, witnesses, juries, and court personnel 
that is having, or is likely to have, a disruptive or chilling effect 
on the proceedings. Judges should be thick-skinned and slow to 
react to perceived insults to their dignity that occur outside the 
context of a particular case or physically removed from the 
courtroom and its environs. 
 Fifth, an approach grounded in insights from outside law is 
not unmindful of the need to provide law students, lawyers, and 
judges with education, assistance, and guidance on matters 
pertaining to their behavior and interactions with others. 
However, training in professionalism would look radically 
different from this prospective. It would not depend so heavily on 
exhortations to honor the law as a profession, to have good 
character, to be an officer of the court, and to go beyond the 
requirements of the rules of professional conduct, although all of 
those ideals would continue to be expressed and affirmed. In 
contrast, an interdisciplinary approach would feature the 
acquisition of certain skills by law students, lawyers, and judges, 
and the provision of meaningful assistance by law schools, the 
Bar, and the courts. 
 Skills training should include exposure to techniques 
promoting the ability to understand others, to have self-awareness, 
and to manage emotions, including in particular anger. Law 
students, lawyers, and judges would be encouraged to gain 
relevant interpersonal skills, such as how to diffuse emotionally 
charged situations and deal with agitated people. Law schools 
and the Bar should consider providing short-term psychological 
therapy and counseling services that would expose law students 
and lawyers to techniques of stress reduction, such as 
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mindfulness meditation.457 Courts might also consider making 
venues available that would facilitate informal efforts to work 
out disagreements and alleviate frustrations among members of 
the legal community.458 This version of professionalism would also 
seek to inspire law students and lawyers, but not by featuring 
lawyers extolling their own virtuous commitment to the ideals of 
the profession. Rather, professionalism CLE sessions and 
workshops with law students would include testimonials by 
lawyers, from all types of law practices and all cultural and 
socio-economic backgrounds, who admit to having behavioral 
problems and discussing how they successfully addressed them. 
 Sixth, while a civil society perspective recognizes that 
civility is an indispensable human good, it also acknowledges 
that it is one no amount of moral lecturing[,] . . . moral 
education, . . . [or] legislative constraint . . . can create.459 Like 
other desirable virtues, such as generosity and gratitude, civility 
in a democracy is not subject to legal coercion.460 The negative 
reaction some commentators have to initiatives aimed at making 
society more polite is similar to the uneasiness many people feel 
about so-called political correctness legislation . . . [in] that it 
makes precisely this mistake [of] . . . tr[ying] to inspire with 
sanctions and punishment what simply cannot be secured by 
sanctions and punishment . . . . A society so regulated and so 
coerced is not civil; it merely looks that way.461  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Finally, while it may be true that one of the highest goods 
of societya free lifecannot be accomplished without civility, 
history teaches us to be sanguine about our desire to stem the 
tide of bad manners, vulgar language, and disrespectfulness. 
Civility, in and of itself, is an equivocal, rather than an 
unambiguous, good.462 The fact that notions of proper behavior 
never seem to stabilize may mean a broader spectrum of society 
is participating in shaping them. As one commentator has 
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observed, [w]hat seems to other[s] . . . to be relativism, 
narcissism, and . . . hedonism [may be], in fact, a new creativity 
in shaping an ethic.463 In a society where honesty and a 
willingness to speak ones mind are encouraged, incivility may be 
the unavoidable result of speech and liberty rights Americans 
have given themselves. A democratic civil society is one that 
tolerates incivility that offends, but does not imperil or obstruct 
the fair administration of justice.464  
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